offering insight into political terrorism as it presents itself in other regions of the world.In surveying here the most visible <strong>and</strong> troubling forms of crime, violence, <strong>and</strong> political terrorismin Latin America, we assume a greatly simplified view of democratization as a transitional coursebringing about participatory processes <strong>and</strong> elections <strong>and</strong> embracing egalitarian values (howeverincompletely), though not necessarily in identical reflection of the United States. Democratizationhas at once objective features (regular elections) as well as subjective intonations (“illiberal”democracy), especially within the American political system. Placed within the context of its currentwar on terrorism, mutual <strong>and</strong> concurrent interests, <strong>and</strong> its extensive history of deliberate hemisphericinvolvement, the United States has justification for careful scrutiny <strong>and</strong> cautious but active responseto political terrorism in Latin America.Theory <strong>and</strong> CausesPolitical terrorism is the deliberate manufacture or manipulation of fear, used as a tool of coercion.It may draw attention to a person, a group, or a cause. It has been used to dem<strong>and</strong> government orlegal reform <strong>and</strong> to free imprisoned comrades. It is infinitely malleable: it can be employed for agreat variety of uses by individuals or groups willing to prey upon fear to achieve their goals. Fornations afflicted, not only are lives lost <strong>and</strong> property damaged but also quality of life degrades <strong>and</strong>national productivity decreases. Governments must also divert valuable <strong>and</strong> scarce resources fromdemocratization <strong>and</strong> development efforts to police, military, <strong>and</strong> juridical actions.In Latin America, the confluence of political terrorism, fragile democratization efforts, <strong>and</strong>depressed economies may be contributing to the decreasing faith in democracy as the appropriate <strong>and</strong>desirable government form. But however unfortunate, history provides evidence that the tactics <strong>and</strong>methods of terrorism have been etched into the ethos of Latin America’s political violence. Terrorismbegets more terrorism <strong>and</strong> in some countries insinuates into the political culture. Old habits diehard. In some cases, persistent <strong>and</strong> pervasive terrorism has left governments critically weakened <strong>and</strong>vulnerable as they limp toward a state that is democratic, stable, <strong>and</strong> consolidated—an impossibilityunder such conditions. State success is jeopardized, to the detriment of the interdependent globalcommunity.The coincidence of several characteristics among nations suffering under political terrorism isstriking. For example, political terrorism in the form of kidnappings is occurring most prevalentlyin transitional societies <strong>and</strong> in societies where painful class conflict exacerbates the socioeconomiccleavages in society. Upon closer examination, the frequency of coincidence of the characteristicsdiscussed below suggests that they encourage an environment of political terrorism.The causes of political terrorism are not simple. A single act may have many explanations, ofwhich some focus on immediate dem<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> others on longer-range patterns. The true cause ofpolitical terrorism within democratizing nations is most accurately described through a number ofvariables based on circumstance <strong>and</strong> context. Eight causative, long-term conditions are immediatelyidentifiable: the transitional nature of these societies; intense class conflict; a distinct political cultureoften based around machismo; the perception of a zero-sum game regarding scarce resources; statefailure to deliver socioeconomic opportunities, mobility, <strong>and</strong> safety nets; the self-perpetuating trapof habit; the absence or decline of traditional restraints (e.g., religion); <strong>and</strong> rising crime <strong>and</strong> narcotrafficking.In addition, there are more immediate causes.1. Transitional Societies. Societies undergoing a transition from agrarian to industrial orindustrial to post-industrial are especially at risk for an upsurge in certain violent crimes. The samerelationship extends to political terrorism. States in transition frequently have societal conditionsconducive to extralegal means of dem<strong>and</strong>ing or producing political change, includingpolitical terrorism. The advancement of the development process provides an economic base <strong>and</strong>172<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11
infrastructure conditions that may also foment crime when coupled with ineffective <strong>and</strong> corruptpolicy, government, or military forces.Transitions in societies are times of political <strong>and</strong>/or social upheaval. Instability unsettles society’sstructures even if the transition itself is not characterized by violence. New cleavages may appear,accompanied by increased lawlessness or corruption. Significant segments of society may haveincomes insufficient to support themselves through legitimate means as their nation shifts from oneeconomic base to another. State-funded social safety nets are minimal or absent under a traditionaldevelopment rubric of austerity. Urbanization increases, yet jobs are scarce <strong>and</strong> cities lack adequateexisting infrastructure to support the population shift. People are lost in societal cracks <strong>and</strong> leftdisenfranchised <strong>and</strong> desperate as old ways of life fade without any clear alternatives provided by thestate or the market. Desperation may encourage political terrorism where there is little confidencein the intended result of successful transition <strong>and</strong> where there are only feeble mechanisms to checkviolence.2. Class Conflict. Class conflict is another explanatory element of political terrorism. Whilemany Latin American countries have experienced increased income over the last decade, incomeinequality remains higher here than in any other region of the world. Economic crisis makes it worse.Few control the preponderance of power <strong>and</strong> resources within many of these societies. In most cases,paper currency translates to political currency, allowing the wealthy to be politically influential <strong>and</strong>marginalizing the overwhelming majority who are poor, working class, or lower class. Thus, masseswho often subsist on less than a living wage <strong>and</strong> who lack basic necessities are left with a sense ofimpotence in a political system that denies them voice, representation, or equal control.Political terrorism confronts these class iniquities, perceived or real. Through their acts,terrorists may seek to galvanize political support behind legal reforms, elections, parties, or evenrevolutionary measures that in some manner address the income <strong>and</strong> power disparities of society.Political terrorists in societies with class conflict may be seeking a redistribution of wealth <strong>and</strong> areallocation of power, however crude their methods or poorly articulated their logic. Terrorist <strong>and</strong>criminal gangs often increase their popularity by building schools, hospitals, <strong>and</strong> athletic fields whichcash-strapped governments cannot afford.3. Political Culture <strong>and</strong> Machismo. Latin American political culture is often characterized ashaving strong elements of machismo, even today. In an environment traditionally dominated bymen <strong>and</strong> where respect is earned through conspicuous bravery, expressions of heroic conquest,<strong>and</strong> decisive action, the methods of political terrorism may resonate with those frustrated by theirineffectiveness within state-sanctioned participatory political processes. This is especially true todayof Central American young people: no jobs, no education, no prospects, hence the turn to crime. Thebigger the guns, the more respect one comm<strong>and</strong>s.Political culture also represents the political norms, underst<strong>and</strong>ings, <strong>and</strong> mores of society. InLatin America, what may have started as an accident of history—the orchestrated use of violenceto achieve either limited or total gain—now has had a certain legitimacy conferred upon it bysuccess, repetition, <strong>and</strong> societal acceptance. Violence becomes part of the political process. Politicalterrorism in every corner of the world has been justified as the fight for freedom. Nowhere hasthat iconography been more celebrated than in the countries of such people as Simon Bolívar, CheGuevara, Fidel Castro, <strong>and</strong> Hugo Chávez.4. Scarce Resources <strong>and</strong> Overcoming the Zero-Sum Game. The scarcity of resources confrontingsome countries of the Caribbean <strong>and</strong> Central <strong>and</strong> South America has rendered developmentconsiderably more problematic. A country with negligible natural endowments or comparativeadvantage in cash crops alone has no obvious economic base that can be cultivated <strong>and</strong> reaped fordevelopment income. Industrialization becomes nearly impossible because raw materials, finished<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11 173
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CommentariesSecurity Cooperation Be
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El espacio de las mujeres en las Fu
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La organización e institucionaliza
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encuentra altamente asociada al cam
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ministerial para la equidad de gén
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BibliografíaBarrancos, Dora (2007)
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Anexo IPaísIncorporación Femenina
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Anexo IIMujeres militares sudameric
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Todo un conjunto de cualidades, cap
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500 y durante la Batalla de Sarand
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miembros de la soberanía de la Nac
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10 de octubre de ese año, la Compa
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algunos barcos de apoyo para alberg
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1.75 metros de altura y como requis
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y sicológica, no sólo en los ámb
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La segunda etapa se caracterizó po
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La normativa vinculada con la asign
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conductas que pudieran encuadrarse
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Género en el marco de las Operacio
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56Security and Defense Studies Revi
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De ese modo nos encontramos con mod
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del total. Debe destacarse que dent
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BibliografíaCarreiras, H.: Gender
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Tras la aprobación de esta histór
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Una vez aprobada la Resolución 132
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para designar asesores de género e
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la construcción de la paz, la reco
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Sin embargo, a medida que avanzaba
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Women on the Front Lines of the Fig
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term even has meaning any longer wi
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following graduation. 15 Of course,
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including members from other Americ
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Solidariedade ou interesse? O que l
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Participação dos Estados-Membros
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sujeitos a alguma OMP. Aqueles que,
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às recomendações das Fases II, I
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Franco, que assumira após o Impeac
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Portanto, não se consegue visualiz
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ReferênciasAlmeida Pinto, J.R. de;
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______. United Nations Department o
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Beyond economic activities, the PRC
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soy oil into the country, a flow wh
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As is the case with Chinese investm
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In some cases, Chinese companies, l
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Although it is not possible to pred
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