Bulletin de liaison etd'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro
de la Prensa-Baszn ()zeti
the next president will be. Massoud Barzani, head of the KOP, insisted: "We are not custom-made revolutionaries ...
We will never become an orderly in the hands of the US or any other force."
The most probable military scenario starts with a massive American bombardment of Saddam's power base and
especially those who protect him, such as the Republican Guard. Once that is under way, the hope is that opposition
forces or his own guards will strike the fatal blow. But the US is not going to spend billions removing Saddam
just to let some disaffected Republican Guard officer or a member of Saddam's T1kriti clan proclaim himself president.
The vast numbers of ground troops reportedly assigned to the Iraqi offensive are probably not intended to take part
in the main battle. More likely, they will move into the vacuum as soon as Saddam has gone to prevent the "wrong"
people from seizing power. While the "wrong" people are easily recognised, the "right" people are less easy to spot.
Reports in several Arab newspapers say the US has already begun a selection process, working through a list of 55
exiled Iraqi officers. It is doubtful whether such a list exists, but informal soundings are certainly taking place. As
in Afghanistan, candidates with useful experience and good connections tend to be unsavoury characters. Almost
any senior military figure who served under Saddam has blood on his hands, so unless care is taken the new cabinet
could turn out to be a collection of war criminals.
The lack of an obvious successor means that, as in Afghanistan, a new government would be likely to be installed in
two stages, starting with a transitional period during which a long-term leader may possibly emerge. Four men
widely tipped to playa key role in this are Ahmed Chalabi, Nizar al-Khazraji, Najib Salihi and Adnan Pachachi.
Of these, Dr Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, is the best known in the west. He is a charismatic figure,
loved and hated in equal measure by different factions of the US administration, and is certainly not an American
yes-man. There have been questions about his financial probity - he was convicted of embezzlement in a Jordanian
banking scandal- but Dr Chalabi says all these accusations have been cooked up by his political enemies. Because
of his powerful friends in Washington he cannot be discounted. America's Iraq Liberation Act - which Dr Chalabi
managed to push through Congress almost single-handedly - institutionalises the INC as the means for funding political
change in Iraq.
General Khazraji, formerly Saddam's chief of staff, fled to the west in 1996 and was eventually granted political asylum
in Denmark. There are claims that he was reluctant to leave Iraq, but that the CIA induced him to do so with
promises of a major political role. The main Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, apparently support him, but a smaller
Kurdish group has sought to have him prosecuted for war crimes. This relates to his alleged role in the use of
chemical weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988. Gen Khazraji says the allegations have been invented
by Iraqi intelligence services. Some in the Iraqi opposition say he may have scuppered his political chances in
a recent interview by appearing too eager to take over from Saddam - he described it as an honour and "a sacred
duty". Brigadier Salihi is a more junior military figure, but increasingly popular. He fled Iraq because of a genuine
grievance - a member of his family was raped - and, although he is a Sunni Muslim, appears to have support among
the Shi'a. He has avoided giving the impression of power-hungriness, and at conferences in the US has argued that
the military should not be directly engaged in politics.
Much of the discussion about future Iraqi governments resembles a casting session for a film of the Afghan war.
People debate who should play Karzai and so on. In this process, Adnan Pachach emerges as the Afghan king. A
former Iraqi foreign minister and now secretary general of the opposition Democratic Centrist Tendency, he might
become a key player, but has said he wants only a facilitating role.
None of this helps to give a clearer view of what Saddam's removal will bring. It only highlights the uncertainties
and unpredictabilities. Comparisons with Afghanistan are not necessarily helpful, either, since it is too early to
know if the interim administration there willlead to stable, democratic government.
In normal times, the world cares little about what happens inside Afghanistan, so long as it keeps its politics to itself.
Iraq, on the other hand, is a major oil producer and central to Middle East politics. The outcome of the struggle for
power in Iraq will have an impact on all its immediate neighbours and far beyond. That is no reason for leaving
Saddam to fester, but military plans need to be backed up with clear political plans. It is not enough to hope that
everything will turn out fine on the night.
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