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Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Bastn Ozeti This is seen not only as an end in itself but also a likely means for legitimizing American intervention. If Saddam allows inspectors back, he is expected to prevent them from conducting the unfettered and intrusive inspection necessary to determine what he has in the way of weapons of mass destruction. The Kurds have direct experience of such weapons. In 1988, Saddam employed poison gas on them, killing 5,000 men, women and children. The Kurds are not alone in worrying that Saddam might resort to such weapons again. U.S. military planners are mulling over how to protect troops from the chemical and biological arms Saddam posses. They also have worries about their neighbors. In the Afghan campaign, all the neighboring governments including eventually Pakistan's, were against the Taliban and al Qaida. The contrary is the case for the Iraqi Kurds. Turkey fears with a paranoid intensity that an American-lead change of regime in Baghdad is all too likely to end with the disintegration of the Iraqi state and the emergence of an independent Kurdistan. The authorities in Ankara, and most critically, the Turkish Army, have said plainly that they would not tolerate a Kurdish state on their border. They fear it would incite renewed separatism in Turkish Kurdistan that marches with Iraq. The Iranians have similar fears involving their Kurds. Both countries have intervened for years in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turkish army has units stationed deep within the region in support of the secular authorities that last year had to fight a Taliban-like Islamist group with ties to Osama bin Laden. The Turks are also concerned about Turkish Kurdish insurrectionaries of the Kurdistan Workers Party, known as the PKK, who are encamped in the mountains that border Iran but from where Turkey is accessible. The Iranians have been active in promoting Kurdish Islamist groups in the PUK area bordering on Iran. At the beginning of February, Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader, reaffirmed a 1997 Tehran accord that protects the Islamists. Then there is the fear of Saddam reconquering all of Northern Iraq. He has massed troops on the edge of autonomous area and probed Kurdish defenses. Of course, if U.S. military intervention ended in the creation of a federal Iraqi state with democratic institutions, the Kurds would be very happy. The problem is that the United States has taught the Kurds not to trust it. In 1975, the United States, having egged on the Kurds to make war on Saddam, withdrew its support overnight. This enabled Saddam to take a terrible vengeance. It is an incident that is said to still trouble Henry Kissinger who was in office at the time. There have been more American betrayals since the Persian Gulf War, first when Bush senior called on the Iraqis to rise up and overthrow Saddam. When they rose, with the government losing control of 14 out of Iraq's 19 provinces, the United States did nothing to help. However, when the pressure of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds trying to escape into Turkey created a crisis for Ankara, the United States helped its Turkish ally by creating the Kurdish safe haven and so ending the Turks' border problem. During the Clinton years there were more incidents when Washington lead the Kurds on, only to change its mind at the last minute. One particularly notable event was the Iraqi army's swoop into Arbil, the seat of the Kurdish administration, on Aug. 31, 1996. The United States did nothing other than send helicopters to pull out as many CIA assets and members of the Iraqi National Congress, then based in Arbil, as it could. Nevertheless, the !NC was decimated. As yet, for all the tough talk in Washington and the undoubted sincerity of the president in wishing to get rid of Saddam, the Iraqi Kurds, and other people in the Middle East, continue to have doubts as to just how much determination the United States would bring to the task. After all, as everyone admits, the administration has yet to make up its mind just what it intends doing and how. So Jalal Talabani has said, "We will not enter adventures whose end is unclear" and the KDP leader, Masud Barzani, "We will not be ordered by America or any others. We will not be a bargaining chip or tool of pressure to be used against Iraq." It was Masud's father, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, whom Kissinger betrayed in 1975. ***** 55
Revu~ de Presse-Pres.s Review-Berhèvoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basm Özeti Kurdish Leaders want to know ~Iternativeto Saddam. Hussein RFE/RL IRAQ REPORT Vol. S, Nq. 6, 15 February 2002 . The two Kurdish leaders Mas'ud Barzani, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), said in an interview with AI-Jazirah Satellite Television on 10 February that before talking about toppling Saddarn Husseyn or participating in a U.S. scenario to strike Iraq, the alternative to the Iraqi president should be known. Barzani stated that "we are not custom-made revolutionaries" and pointed out that "the situation here is completely different than that of Mghanistan.~' The AI-Jazirah interviewer askedhim about the current status of his dialogue with Baghdad. He answered that there are no conditions for holding the dialogue, but, "as you know, the Kurds are unanimous on a federal solution to the Kurdish issue within a united Iraq." Talabani believes that it is impossible to change the Baghdad regime from the inside by means öf a coup .."First, the Iraqi army has become a large army that consists of tens of divisions. Second, moving anymilitary uni.t requires the approval of a number of sides, including the military commander, the party official, the special sem.lrityofficial and the intelligence official. Third, the military units move without ammunition. In addition, the present regime has its own guard, the Republican Guard. Therefore, I do not believe a military coup is possible." . In an earlier interview with NTV in Istanbul on 8 February, Barzani also made the point that if Saddam is to be replaced "the identity of theperson who will replaCé Saddarn is important. I can say this is the mostimportant point for us. He also pointed out that if the United States decided to strike Iraq, there is nothing "we" could do. "Nevertheless, we will never.become an orderly in the hands of.the United States or any other force. Nor will we serve as a negotiating card or as a means of pressure to be useC;iagainst Baghdad." (David.Nissman) Iraq Press (London) Fébruary 19,2002 ***** Saddam mulling'peace with Kurds Arbil - The embattled Iraqi leader is considering a peace initiative to bring rebel Kurds to the negotiating table. The Iraq Press has learned that Saddarn Hussein has held a meeting with senior aides to discuss the possibility of granting Iraqi Kurds sweeping autonomous powers. The move is seen as part of Saddam's last-minute overtures to avert a possible U.5, militarystrike to overthrow his regime. The United States has made it clear that it advocates a regime change in ~aghdad. . Senior U.S.,officials have said they are determined to topple, Saddarn even if they have to açt unilaterally. The Kurds turned down Saddarn's previous calls for negotiations, saying there is no guarantee the Iraqi strongman will not renege on any promises he makes. Saddarn, according to well-informed sources, is expected to address the nation shortly to announce the initiative. No details ar~ available on what Saddam has in mind and'whether the Kurds will welcome the overture. ; , The Kurds administer their own affairs away from Saddam's authority in a semi- independent enclave that .includes much of Iraqi Kurdistan. U.S. and British warplanes mount almost daily patrols of the area to deter Saddam from sending troops into the region. Saddarn has recently made several peaceful overtures with the aim of persuading the Americans to change heart. But his moves have all but foundered .. Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have spumed his offer to normalize ties. And many see his proposal to the United Nations for talks without preconditions as merely a tactical move to buy time. ***** 56
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