Bulletin de liaison etd'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison etd'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison etd'information - Institut kurde de Paris
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Revue <strong>de</strong> Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-l)entrp <strong>de</strong> la Prensa-Basln Ozeti<br />
ted out that-when Iraq wasfoun<strong>de</strong>d in thebe~g of the last çen.tury, some citizens were more equal than others.<br />
The rights of the Kurds, the Shi'ites and those of minorities such as Turkomen, Assyrians; Chal<strong>de</strong>ails, Yeiidies, Jews<br />
and Sabia's, were both recognized and violated.<br />
Bur<strong>de</strong>ns grew and became worse, but the catastrophic <strong>de</strong>terioration occurred un<strong>de</strong>r the present regime. Iraq is now<br />
consi<strong>de</strong>red one of the most closed statesin the twenty-first century. Reformation and <strong>de</strong>mocratisation of Iraq is possible<br />
when the people of Iraq and the world <strong>de</strong>mocracies unite their efforts to facilitate this reformation and <strong>de</strong>mocratisation.<br />
Dictatorship cannot bring stability. Denial of communal rights c~ates instability, and breeds evil totalitarian<br />
approaches in the streets as well as in the palaces of the <strong>de</strong>spots. Recognition of people's rights is an essential<br />
ingredient in bringing stability and prosperity. '<br />
The next three speakers, Paul Hist, Faleh Jabar and ~ Zubaida were from London University's Bribeck College.<br />
Paul Hirst <strong>de</strong>scribed the are three basic elements of <strong>de</strong>mQCracy: representative government; a liberal framework of<br />
political norms and social and institutional pluralism. Some people give much greater emphasis to one of the three<br />
and often the relationship between the three is confused in our everyday politicallanguage.<br />
Hist drew attention to the huge wave of <strong>de</strong>mocratisation that has taken place in the last twenty years and said it was<br />
obviously better than a wave of authoritarianism but many of these new regimes are weak <strong>de</strong>mocracies with shallow<br />
foundations. When people argue about systems of government one thing that becomes absolutely clear is that<br />
whatever the faults of <strong>de</strong>mocracy, anything else is worse. The fundamental reason is that if government does not<br />
involve consulting the people who are affected by <strong>de</strong>cisions then those qecisions will tend to be bad and self-interested.<br />
Faleh Jabar conclu<strong>de</strong>d that there is a new co-relation between the state and society. The total hegemony which was<br />
achieved by the Baath Party, through oil revenues, through psychological hegemony, its security apparatuses and<br />
even by the success of the socÎél1services is cracking. The very pillars of these successes are cracking. Some of them<br />
have crackéd beyond recognition. This will create a new window of opportunity for civil society and perhaps some<br />
sort of <strong>de</strong>mocratisation.<br />
, Sami Zubaida drew attention to the factthe countries in the region which have a measure of real pluralism although<br />
not often of liberalism or of the rule of law are Turkey and Iran in very different ways. In both Turkey and Iran very<br />
few of the politiCal forces and the centres of social power are <strong>de</strong>mocratic. But at the same time the very fact that there<br />
is a multiplicity of power centres, and each one of them may be ~emocratic, promotes the possibility of <strong>de</strong>mocracy.<br />
This was also true of pre civil war Lebanon. You don't have an Ab<strong>de</strong>l Nasser, of Saddam Hussein or Qathafi who will<br />
just hold all the power within a clique in the centre but for historical reasons you have a dispersion of centres of social<br />
power.<br />
So the road to <strong>de</strong>mocratisation is really a very difficult one. I can only conclu<strong>de</strong> with the reported response of the<br />
Irish peasant who was asked by a tourist how do I get to Dublin from here? He replied: If I were I would not start<br />
from here at all.<br />
In his analysis of Turkey's attitu<strong>de</strong> towards <strong>de</strong>mocràtisation in Iraq Dr William Hale from the ~partment of Political<br />
Studies at SOAS said that Turkey has some difficulties over this: it doesn't want to push this as a major point since<br />
its main efforts are concentrated on <strong>de</strong>mocratisation at home, and <strong>de</strong>aling with its own Kurdish problem. It also probably<br />
doesn't want to annoy Saddam unnecessarily, and insists merely that he must comply over weapons inspections,<br />
etc. However, in principle it strongly favours a more <strong>de</strong>mocratic and stable Iraq, provi<strong>de</strong>d this can be achieved<br />
withoùt a period of chaos or dismemberment of the country.<br />
Turkish reactions to the extension of the war on terrorism to Iraq are not quite certain. For instance, Turkish<br />
Ambassador in Washington, told the US journal Defense News in November that 'we would <strong>de</strong>finitely rather the war<br />
did not spread to a neighbouring country .... However, if credible evi<strong>de</strong>nce is given that Iraq was behind the terrorist<br />
attacks on the United States then Turkey would not ignore the matter, it would review its standards vis-a-vis Iraq.'<br />
Similarly, on December 19th the Defènce Minister, Sabahattin Cakmakimlu, was quoted as saying that 'we have frequently<br />
stated that we do not want an operation directed against Iraq. But new conditions could bring new assessments<br />
onto our agenda'. ' '<br />
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