Advances in Fingerprint Technology.pdf

APPENDIX
Daubert Hearings
EDWARD GERMAN*
During most of the 20th century in America, the admissibility of friction
ridge evidence in the vast majority of American courts relied upon the 1923
“Frye” rule of “general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”
(Frye v. United States, 293 F2d. 1013, D.C. Cir. 1923). So long as it could be
shown that a scientific principle or discovery, such as the uniqueness and
permanence of friction ridge formations, was generally accepted by other
experts, it was admissible. Those few states not adopting the “Frye test”
generally embraced Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (or a similar state rule) to
ensure that expert testimony was relevant and based on reliable scientific
theories.
Beginning in 1993, however, the admissibility of friction ridge identification
has come under much closer scrutiny. In 1993, a civil case (Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786) ruled that the Federal Rules
of Evidence superseded “general acceptance” tests for admissibility of novel
scientific evidence; and that the rigid “general acceptance” test, which arose
from Frye v. United States, is at odds with the liberal thrust of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
The Daubert ruling stated that:
• The trial judge must still screen scientific evidence to ensure it is
relevant and reliable.
• “The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions they generate.”
• Factors the court should consider include:
• Testing and validation
• Peer review
• Rate of error
• “General acceptance”
* Included with the author’s permission; originally prepared by the author and others for
posting at http://onin.com/fp.