Ethnic Hostility among Ethnic Majority and Minority Groups

1. Introduction | The setting of this book: The Netherlands
Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Huntington, 1993; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Strabac
& Listhaug, 2008). Third, the rise of the political party LPF (List Pim Fortuyn). Its leader, the
fl amboyant politician Pim Fortuyn, fuelled discontent, openly challenged multiculturalism, wanted
to put an end to Muslim immigration (“Fortuyn: grens dicht voor islamiet,” 2002) and was strongly
in favour of assimilation policies. During the elections of May 2002, his political party caused a
landslide in the Dutch political scene even tough he was murdered by a Dutch environmentalist
before the elections took place.
Others state that Dutch multicultural practices have been challenged as early as the
beginning of the 1990s, by people like the leader of the liberal party (VVD) at that time, Frits
Bolkestein (e.g. Bolkestein, 1991), but also that “multiculturalism was never accepted or practised
as fully as suggested in more stereotypical depictions of Dutch integration politics” (Vink, 2007,
p. 2). However, most experts will probably agree that especially in the last decade, tensions
between native Dutch and minority groups became more visible and more explicitly a subject of
debate. More or less simultaneously, integration policies toughened.
Ethnic tension certainly became manifest when in November 2004 Theo van Gogh, a
publicist and cineaste, was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri for his views about Islamic culture
which he ventilated in his typical, blunt ‘van Gogh style’. Mohammed Bouyeri was a child of
Moroccan immigrants. He had successfully completed intermediate general secondary education
(HAVO) and was also otherwise seemingly well integrated into Dutch society (Buijs, Demant, &
Hamdy, 2006). The case of Bouyeri thus exemplifi es how educational integration and cultural
integration do not always go hand in hand. His case is certainly not unique though: Mohammed
Sidique Khan and Shedzad Tanweer, two of the British Muslims behind the 7 July 2005 London
bombings, studied at Leeds Metropolitan University (“Profi le: Mohammad Sidique Khan,” 2007;
“Suicide bombers’ ‘ordinary’ lives,” 2005). Several scholars therefore speak of an integration paradox
(Buijs et al., 2006; Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009; Shaw, 2002; Werbner, 2001). The understanding
that educational integration is not always related to less ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities
illustrates the relevance of my study in Chapter 7 on the general effect of education on ethnic
hostility among a representative sample of ethnic minorities.
Shortly after the assassination of van Gogh, mimicking the vocabulary of George W. Bush
after 9/11, Gerrit Zalm, Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands at that time, declared war on
terrorism (“Kabinet verklaart terreur de oorlog,” 2004). His choice of words was heavily criticised
because the term ‘war’ in Dutch (oorlog) is almost solely used to refer to a war between countries
and not to indicate a strong effort over a long period of time to get rid of something. What Zalm
probably meant to get across is that he would support tougher immigration and integration
policies. As a reaction to the assassination of van Gogh, several arson attacks on mosques and an
Islamic elementary schools took place or were attempted. According to the national newspaper
de Volkskrant, many people felt as being on the brink of falling into a canyon of chaos, hate and
escalating violence (Wagendorp, 2004).
The attacks of members of minority groups directed to (members of) the host country are
extreme examples of a faltering cultural integration process. Lacking cultural integration will often
take on more subtle forms (e.g. ethnic prejudice, ethnic distance, lack of identifi cation with the
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