Ethnic Hostility among Ethnic Majority and Minority Groups

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Table 3.3 continued Routine non-manual 0.02 0.17 -0.04 0.17 -0.03 0.17 Small self-employed -0.13 0.30 -0.08 0.31 -0.11 0.30 Skilled manual -0.13 0.20 -0.20 0.21 -0.21 0.20 Religiosity Church attendance (*10) -0.05* 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.08* 0.02 Denomination (no denomination = ref.) Missing 0.24 0.19 0.64 0.20 0.00 0.19 Roman Catholic 0.37* 0.09 0.05 0.09 -0.14 0.09 Dutch Reformed/Calvinist 0.27* 0.12 -0.09 0.12 0.07 0.12 Other Calvinist 0.53* 0.25 -0.15 0.25 0.16 0.25 Other Christian denomination 0.05 0.21 -0.28 0.21 0.06 0.21 Other religion 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.08 0.22 Neighbourhood characteristics Socio-economic disadvantage Change in socio-economic disadvantage Relative inwards-moving mobility*10 -0.08* 0.02 -0.10* 0.02 Municipality characteristics Percentage of ethnic minorities -0.01 0.01 -0.01* 0.01 Change in percentage of ethnic minorities 0.09~ 0.05 0.14* 0.05 Socio-economic disadvantage Change in socio-economic disadvantage Relative inwards-moving mobility*10 0.04 0.03 0.07* 0.03 *p
3.5 CONCLUSIONS We observed a weak variation across municipalities in mean levels of opposition to ethnic heterogamy. Most of this variance was explained by compositional differences, for which we found that the individual-level characteristics are in line with Ethnic Competition Theory. The strongest municipality variance reduction was caused by the religious composition of the municipality though. Religiosity turned out to be a strong predictor for opposition to ethnic heterogamy. Moreover, parental education and father’s social class contributed to the explanatory power of the model even after controlling for respondents’ characteristics. We did not observe a signifi cant variation across neighbourhoods in opposition to ethnic intermarriage when we took into acount that neighbourhoods are nested within municipalities. However, we showed that contextual characteristics of both municipalities and neighbourhoods affect attitudes towards ethnic heterogamy, where the municipality level plays a larger role. Within the Netherlands, individuals do not hold more, but less negative views on ethnic outgroups when the percentage of such groups in municipalities is higher. This fi nding holds for both the lower and higher educated; therefore in support of contact theory. Interestingly, at the neighbourhood level, for respondents with low educational levels – whom we assume to be relegated to neighbourhoods with higher percentages of ethnic minorities due to economic constraints –, the percentage of ethnic minorities is related to more opposition to ethnic intermarriage. This fi nding clearly supports the threat mechanism. On the other hand, for higher educated individuals, larger outgroups within the neighbourhood are related to less opposition to ethnic intermarriage. This is likely the result of white fl ight and selective in-migration of individuals who have the luxury to choose their neighbourhood. A relative increase in the size of the ethnic outgroup at the municipality level increases opposition to ethnic heterogamy, especially in municipalities with relatively large outgroups. In these cities, the possibility of contact with ethnic minorities will hardly increase with larger outgroups. Consequently, the threat mechanism induced by an increase in outgroup size may be easier to observe. Economic characteristics of the municipality account partially for the negative relation between group sizes and opposition to ethnic intermarriage. Studies that interpret the negative correlation between proximity of outgroups and prejudice as supportive for the contact hypothesis suffer a severe weakness if they do not control for the economic condition of the geographical unit. A deteriorating socio-economic status at the neighbourhood and municipality levels increases opposition to ethnic intermarriage. We therefore fi nd confi rmation for our economic environment hypothesis. Moreover, the mechanism by which group competition leads to exclusionist attitudes and in turn to opposition to ethnic intermarriage is only confi rmed for economic competition; cultural competition and physical competition at the neighbourhood and municipality levels do not induce ethnic hostility. If ethnic competition causes ethnic hostility, our fi ndings show that economic competition is the most important, if not the sole, type of competition within the locale that causes an increase in opposition to ethnic heterogamy within the Netherlands. The perception of cultural and physical competition may be infl uenced by the 68
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ETHNIC HOSTILITY AMONG ETHNIC MAJOR
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Promotores: prof. dr. N. D. de Graa
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Science is so much more fun when yo
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3.4.1 Opposition to ethnic intermar
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8.3.1 Theoretical implications for
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1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 NEW QUESTIONS 1
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1. Introduction | New questions ski
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6. EXPLANATIONS FOR ETHNIC EDUCATIO
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To answer our research questions, w
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6. Explanations for Ethnic Educatio
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Table 6.1 continued Pre-university
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Table 6.2 continued Lower general t
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Model 4 includes both the ability m
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7. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND ETHNI
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among four ethnic minority groups i
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7. Educational Attainment and Ethni
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Table 7.1 Summary of hypotheses Cor
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Table 7.2 continued Control variabl
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Table 7.3 continued 2nd gen. Turks
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Table 7.4 continued 2nd gen. Turks
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8. CONCLUSION 8.1 INTRODUCTION 8. C
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8.2 QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND CONCLUSI
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8. Conclusion | Questions, results
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local living environments (on ethni
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8. Conclusion | Theoretical implica
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ethnic hosting threat contact / res
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8. Conclusion | Retrospect and pros
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8. Conclusion | Notes 195
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APPENDIX Appendix 197
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APPENDIX 2.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
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Appendix 2.3 continued Mobility typ
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APPENDIX 2.4 TUTORIAL DIAGONAL MOBI
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*********MEANS and OLS***********.
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impact on depY. *The relative impac
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Appendix *The impact of the destina
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vector d = d1 to d6. vector p = p1
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*and with constraints our model wou
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Appendix 215
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Appendix 3.1 continued father’s s
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APPENDIX 3.3 OPPOSITION TO ETHNIC I
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Appendix Appendix 4.1 continued Eco
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Appendix APPENDIX 4.3 VARIANCE COMP
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Appendix 5.1 continued Ethnicity N
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APPENDIX 5.3 ROBUSTNESS OF ES ASSOC
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Appendix APPENDIX 5.5 MULTI-NOMINAL
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Appendix 7.1 continued 2nd gen. 2nd
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Appendix 233
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Bibliography Abu-Rayya
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Bibliography Buijs, F. J., Demant,
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Bibliography (pp. 345-383). Oxford:
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Bibliography euthanasia, homosexual
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Bibliography Onderzoek (ISEO). Mart
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Bibliography Politics, 58(1), 41-72
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Bibliography Worchel (Eds.), The so
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Bibliography 249
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Summary in Dutch / Nederlandstalige
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CURRICULUM VITAE Curriculum Vitae J
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ICS DISSERTATION SERIES ICS dissert
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ICS dissertation series 37) Andreas
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ICS dissertation series 76) Inge Si
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ICS dissertation series 115) Martin
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Why do some individuals express mor
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Ethnic Hostility among Ethnic Majority and Minority Groups

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