Regulation of Health and Social Care Professionals Consultation

may appoint employees and has a wide power to delegate functions or seek
assistance in the discharge of its functions as well as the keeping of accounts. 10
10.13 The Health and Social Care Bill 2011 which is currently before Parliament
proposes to change some of these governance arrangements. These proposed
changes would mean that the Privy Council will have responsibility for appointing
the three non-executive members currently appointed by the Secretary of State,
whilst there will be one executive member rather than two. The power of the
devolved administrations to appoint non-executive Council members would
remain. The CHRE is also going to be given responsibility for developing
standards for appointments made by the regulators. 11
Provisional view
10.14 As a result of the reforms that are likely to be introduced by the Health and Social
Care Bill 2011, the Privy Council will appoint the Council of the CHRE. However,
in Part 2 we have argued that the role of the Privy Council is effectively
performed by central Government. The Privy Council will therefore cease to be
involved in professional regulation. In relation to appointments to the CHRE this
presents us with two principal options.
10.15 First, the CHRE could be given overall responsibility for appointing its own
Council members, supplemented by a power to determine the composition of
their Council. In Part 4 we have proposed giving the regulators the power to
appoint their own Council members and determine the composition of their
Councils, and arguably the same approach should apply to the CHRE. However,
it should be recognised that the CHRE is in a different position to the regulators.
As noted previously in this Part, the CHRE exists at a higher level in the
regulatory framework and so is not overseen in the same way as the regulators.
Therefore, it may be desirable to for an independent body to make or oversee
appointments to the CHRE.
10.16 Alternatively, the Government could be given direct responsibility for appointing
CHRE Council members. Such a role could apply either to the three nonexecutive
members, the appointment of whom the Health and Social Care Bill
would pass to the Privy Council, or could apply to all of the non-executive
members. A role for Government in this process could be justified as properly
reflecting the Government’s ultimate responsibility to ensure that the regulators
act in the public interest. The Government has experience in making
appointments to the CHRE through its role of adviser to the Privy Council. While
there may be concerns that this option would have implications for CHRE’s
perceived independence, as set out in Part 2 we do not think that the current
system of formal Privy Council appointment affords any such independence.
Under this option, the Government could, if it so wished, delegate responsibility
9
Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (Appointment, Procedure etc) Regulations,
SI 2008 No 2927.
10 NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002, sch 7.
11
Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence, Proposals for CHRE’s new roles and
responsibilities (2010).
194