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Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC ...

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XIII<br />

6. <strong>Tax</strong> preferences create <strong>in</strong>equities by favor<strong>in</strong>g some taxpayers over o<strong>the</strong>rs. This can<br />

underm<strong>in</strong>e general compliance.<br />

7. As a development tool, tax <strong>in</strong>centives score poorly <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> transparency <strong>and</strong><br />

accountability.<br />

8. The cash value <strong>of</strong> tax <strong>in</strong>centives stimulates political manipulation <strong>and</strong> corrupt practices.<br />

9. Alternative <strong>in</strong>struments for promot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestment can have much more favorable <strong>and</strong><br />

last<strong>in</strong>g effects on productivity, growth, <strong>and</strong> development.<br />

10. International experience shows that tax <strong>in</strong>centives most <strong>of</strong>ten do not deliver favorable<br />

results!<br />

In short, <strong>the</strong>re are arguments both for <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment tax <strong>in</strong>centives that<br />

must be taken seriously. The applicable balance will vary accord<strong>in</strong>g to circumstances. The<br />

danger is that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political discourse <strong>the</strong> benefits are usually exaggerated, while <strong>the</strong> costs<br />

are downplayed or ignored. This creates a strong bias toward <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> poor tax<br />

<strong>in</strong>centive policies.<br />

Tools for Analyz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Tax</strong> <strong>Incentives</strong><br />

Three important tools for analyz<strong>in</strong>g tax <strong>in</strong>centive policies are <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>al effective tax rate<br />

(METR) model, tax expenditure budget<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> specification <strong>of</strong> screen<strong>in</strong>g criteria for<br />

apply<strong>in</strong>g selective <strong>in</strong>centives. The METR model provides a gauge for evaluat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> extent to<br />

which various tax <strong>in</strong>centive packages improve <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> return for representative <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />

projects, at <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>. <strong>Tax</strong> expenditure budget<strong>in</strong>g is a valuable method for monitor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />

amount <strong>of</strong> foregone revenue from tax <strong>in</strong>centives. Every member country <strong>of</strong> <strong>SADC</strong> should be<br />

tak<strong>in</strong>g steps to adopt <strong>the</strong>se two tools for policy analysis.<br />

In screen<strong>in</strong>g projects that will benefit from selective <strong>in</strong>centives, <strong>the</strong> goal should be avoid<br />

forgo<strong>in</strong>g tax revenue for <strong>in</strong>vestments that would be undertaken anyway. In general, projects<br />

that are efficient <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able are likely to materialize even without special tax breaks. The<br />

exception is “footloose” <strong>in</strong>vestment that can easily locate <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries. <strong>Incentives</strong> can<br />

also be effective <strong>in</strong> stimulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestments that are not viable without a tax break. However,<br />

<strong>the</strong>se are projects with low productivity, by def<strong>in</strong>ition. The criteria used to target <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />

<strong>in</strong>centives <strong>of</strong>ten fail to pick projects that will deliver large benefits relative to <strong>the</strong> revenue cost.<br />

Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, any selective screen<strong>in</strong>g process can be subverted by political maneuver<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Design <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tax</strong> <strong>Incentives</strong><br />

Common <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>in</strong>clude low overall tax rates, preferential tax rates for certa<strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>vestments, tax holidays, capital recovery allowances, <strong>in</strong>vestment tax credits, <strong>the</strong> treatment<br />

<strong>of</strong> dividends, excess deductions for designated expenses, special export <strong>in</strong>centives, reduced

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