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Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC ...

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1-4 EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES IN THE <strong>SADC</strong> REGION<br />

• M<strong>in</strong>imizes <strong>the</strong> tax burden on <strong>the</strong> poor;<br />

• Collects more from <strong>the</strong> rich than from those with lower <strong>in</strong>comes (vertical equity);<br />

• Avoids excessive tax rates <strong>and</strong> arbitrary impositions all around; <strong>and</strong><br />

•<br />

Provides relatively uniform <strong>and</strong> non-discrim<strong>in</strong>atory treatment <strong>of</strong> taxpayers with similar<br />

economic circumstances <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> ability to pay (horizontal equity).<br />

Equity issues are <strong>of</strong>ten neglected <strong>in</strong> deliberations about tax <strong>in</strong>centives, but <strong>the</strong>y surely bear<br />

consideration as a matter <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, <strong>and</strong> also because perceptions <strong>of</strong> unfairness can<br />

underm<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> political susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>centive program. Investment <strong>in</strong>centives directly<br />

reduce <strong>the</strong> tax burden on <strong>in</strong>come earned by relatively wealthy <strong>in</strong>vestors. As a result o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

taxpayers may bear a greater tax burden. For example, if <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong>centives reduce<br />

company tax revenue, <strong>the</strong>n governments may depend more heavily on <strong>in</strong>direct taxes which<br />

impose a greater burden on poorer segments <strong>of</strong> society. In addition, most programs are<br />

designed to favor certa<strong>in</strong> taxpayers over o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>in</strong> similar economic conditions. To<br />

compensate for <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>equities <strong>the</strong>re must be a clear expectation that <strong>the</strong> tax <strong>in</strong>centives will<br />

truly <strong>and</strong> substantially foster equitable growth <strong>and</strong> job creation.<br />

From <strong>the</strong>se three basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, one can see why many public f<strong>in</strong>ance specialists ask hard<br />

questions about <strong>the</strong> advisability <strong>of</strong> tax <strong>in</strong>centive programs. Yet most governments deviate<br />

from <strong>the</strong> pure pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> taxation to pursue o<strong>the</strong>r public policy objectives. There is no a<br />

priori reason not to do so because <strong>the</strong> tax code is an obvious tool for social <strong>and</strong> economic<br />

eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g. The primary question, <strong>the</strong>n, is whe<strong>the</strong>r tax <strong>in</strong>centives stimulate <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tended<br />

behavior <strong>and</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ir overall impact is beneficial or detrimental to ultimate policy<br />

objectives. The secondary question is how best to design <strong>in</strong>vestment tax <strong>in</strong>centives to achieve<br />

<strong>the</strong> objectives at m<strong>in</strong>imum cost.<br />

1.2 What are <strong>Tax</strong> <strong>Incentives</strong>?<br />

The <strong>SADC</strong> MOU on taxation (2002) def<strong>in</strong>es “tax <strong>in</strong>centives” as “fiscal measures that are used<br />

to attract local or foreign <strong>in</strong>vestment capital to certa<strong>in</strong> economic activities or particular areas<br />

<strong>in</strong> a country.” 8 Zee, Stotsky <strong>and</strong> Ley (2002) adopt a similar def<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>in</strong> a recent review <strong>of</strong> this<br />

topic. They claim that “any tax provision that is applicable to all <strong>in</strong>vestment projects does not<br />

constitute a tax <strong>in</strong>centive.” This def<strong>in</strong>ition excludes “general tax <strong>in</strong>centives,” such as<br />

accelerated depreciation that applies to all <strong>in</strong>vestments. Such general tax provisions deserve<br />

to be called <strong>in</strong>centives for three reasons. First, <strong>the</strong>y are designed as such <strong>and</strong> function as such.<br />

Second, it makes sense for a government to broadcast that it is <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g attractive tax<br />

<strong>in</strong>centives for <strong>in</strong>vestment even if <strong>the</strong>y take <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> general ra<strong>the</strong>r than selective provisions<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tax code. And third, a number <strong>of</strong> countries, such as Indonesia <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a, have shifted<br />

8 Essentially <strong>the</strong> same def<strong>in</strong>ition is used by <strong>the</strong> International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation. While <strong>the</strong><br />

def<strong>in</strong>ition covers both direct <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>direct taxes, <strong>the</strong> MOU focuses largely on <strong>the</strong> former category.

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