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4-6 EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES IN THE <strong>SADC</strong> REGION<br />

Table 4-1<br />

International Comparisons <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marg<strong>in</strong>al Effective <strong>Tax</strong> Rate, circa 1985<br />

Selected Countries<br />

Ranked by Basic <strong>Tax</strong> Rate<br />

Statutory <strong>Tax</strong><br />

Rate circa 1985<br />

METR with all<br />

Equity F<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

METR with 50%<br />

Debt F<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Ecuador 20.0 13.5 10.1<br />

Colombia 30.0 28.5 36.9<br />

Korea 30.0 33.3 32.8<br />

Jamaica 33.3 40.6 35.3<br />

Brazil 35.0 54.4 45.9<br />

Thail<strong>and</strong> 35.0 24.9 20.0<br />

Malaysia 40.0 31.7 24.2<br />

Portugal 40.0 45.5 28.7<br />

Guatemala 42.0 10.7 2.8<br />

Irel<strong>and</strong> 50.0 5.8 5.5<br />

Note: Calculations are based on <strong>the</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>tical project described <strong>in</strong> Exhibit 4-1. Calculations assume 5<br />

percent <strong>in</strong>flation. The low METR figures for Irel<strong>and</strong> reflect full first-year expens<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> capital outlays, with no<br />

deduction for nom<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>terest expenses.<br />

SOURCE: World Bank (1988), page 93, based on papers cited <strong>the</strong>re<strong>in</strong> by Pellechio <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />

We have extended <strong>the</strong> Dunn <strong>and</strong> Pellechio (1990) model by add<strong>in</strong>g a calculation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present<br />

value <strong>of</strong> taxes received by <strong>the</strong> government (PVtax) under each scenario. This allows one to<br />

compare <strong>the</strong> reduction <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> METR—which measures <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>centive effect—aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong><br />

reduction <strong>in</strong> revenue, for each tax measure. One can express this relationship as ratio, with<br />

both variables be<strong>in</strong>g measured as percentage changes from benchmark values reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ard tax regime. This ratio provides an <strong>in</strong>dex <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relative cost-effectiveness (RCE) <strong>of</strong><br />

various tax <strong>in</strong>centives. If <strong>the</strong> RCE <strong>in</strong>dex is greater than 1.00, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>centive effect (reduction<br />

<strong>in</strong> METR) is proportionally greater than <strong>the</strong> adverse revenue effect (reduction <strong>in</strong> PVtax). Table<br />

4-2 shows <strong>the</strong> RCE <strong>in</strong>dex for 11 different tax <strong>in</strong>centive provisions, <strong>and</strong> four illustrative<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment projects. The specifications are expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> notes to <strong>the</strong> table.<br />

The most strik<strong>in</strong>g feature <strong>of</strong> Table 4-2 is that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment tax credit (ITC) delivers by far <strong>the</strong><br />

largest <strong>in</strong>centive effect relative to <strong>the</strong> revenue loss, with a RCE ratio <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> 1.43 to 1.81<br />

depend<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment project. The least cost-efficient <strong>in</strong>struments<br />

are <strong>the</strong> 10-year tax holiday <strong>and</strong> a reduction <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> general company tax rate from 35 percent to<br />

15 percent. For most <strong>in</strong>struments <strong>the</strong> RCE ratio lies between 0.95 <strong>and</strong> 1.05, <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>centive <strong>in</strong>strument reduces <strong>the</strong> METR <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> revenue <strong>in</strong>take <strong>in</strong> approximately equal<br />

proportions.<br />

Insights from illustrative calculations must be used with caution, because <strong>the</strong> results depend<br />

heavily on <strong>the</strong> parameters be<strong>in</strong>g used. This is not so much a weakness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> model as a<br />

reflection <strong>of</strong> reality. That is, <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> any particular tax measure depends on many<br />

parameters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tax system <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment project. For this reason, it is very important<br />

to customize <strong>the</strong> analysis to fit <strong>the</strong> circumstances <strong>in</strong> each country. The best way to do this is to

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