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Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC ...

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3-2 EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES IN THE <strong>SADC</strong> REGION<br />

private decisions based on free-market signals lead to an <strong>in</strong>efficient undersupply <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>novation. There is <strong>the</strong>n a logical justification for government <strong>in</strong>tervention to<br />

enhance <strong>the</strong> market <strong>in</strong>centive for <strong>in</strong>vestment, research <strong>and</strong> development, <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Tax</strong><br />

breaks can be useful for this purpose.<br />

3. Practicality. Although <strong>the</strong> fundamental purpose <strong>of</strong> taxation is to raise revenue, <strong>the</strong> tax<br />

system <strong>in</strong>herently <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>variably affects economic <strong>in</strong>centives. It is <strong>the</strong>refore a convenient,<br />

practical, <strong>and</strong> flexible <strong>in</strong>strument for <strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>in</strong> a direction that contributes to<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r policy objectives such as <strong>in</strong>vestment promotion, job creation, development <strong>of</strong><br />

disadvantaged regions, or upgrad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> labor force.<br />

4. Signal<strong>in</strong>g. In conjunction with o<strong>the</strong>r measures to create a welcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestment climate,<br />

<strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g tax breaks for <strong>in</strong>vestors can signal a country’s commitment to facilitat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment. It also provides a headl<strong>in</strong>e banner for market<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> country as a desirable<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment dest<strong>in</strong>ation.<br />

5. Capital Mobility. In a global economy with high mobility capital, <strong>the</strong> effective tax rate on<br />

capital has to be low to attract <strong>in</strong>ward flows <strong>of</strong> foreign <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>and</strong> keep domestic sav<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

at home to f<strong>in</strong>ance productive <strong>in</strong>vestment.<br />

6. <strong>Tax</strong> Competition. When o<strong>the</strong>r countries vie for <strong>the</strong> same <strong>in</strong>vestments by <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g special tax<br />

breaks, <strong>the</strong> stark choice may be to match <strong>the</strong> tax breaks or lose <strong>the</strong> benefits that may come<br />

from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestments, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g growth-enhanc<strong>in</strong>g spillover effects.<br />

7. Compensat<strong>in</strong>g for O<strong>the</strong>r Deficiencies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Investment Climate. A common argument <strong>in</strong><br />

less developed countries is that attractive fiscal benefits are essential to ga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>vestors who would o<strong>the</strong>rwise not consider <strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g because <strong>of</strong> problems, such as<br />

unreliable or high cost <strong>in</strong>frastructure, macroeconomic <strong>in</strong>stability, or a weak legal <strong>and</strong> judicial<br />

system.<br />

8. Revenue Ga<strong>in</strong>s. If it is so that <strong>in</strong>vestors would go elsewhere <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g special<br />

tax breaks, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> direct revenue loss from <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g such <strong>in</strong>centives is nil. And <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>direct<br />

revenue impact can be favorable, because <strong>the</strong> new <strong>in</strong>vestments that materialize through <strong>the</strong><br />

tax <strong>in</strong>centive program will create jobs <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>kage effects that generate tax revenue.<br />

9. Political Cover. The cost <strong>of</strong> tax <strong>in</strong>centives is less visible than that <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment promotion<br />

policies that <strong>in</strong>volve explicit budget outlays. This argument is rarely uttered out loud, but it<br />

undoubtedly contributes to <strong>the</strong> political attraction <strong>of</strong> tax <strong>in</strong>centives, compared to alternatives<br />

that have a direct budgetary impact, such as subsidies or <strong>in</strong>frastructure development for<br />

<strong>in</strong>dustrial zones.<br />

10. Experience Shows that <strong>Incentives</strong> Can Work! Above all, <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> argument for <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />

tax <strong>in</strong>centives is that <strong>the</strong>y have worked well <strong>in</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> countries. Exhibit 3-1 provides a

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