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Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC ...

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2-8 EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES IN THE <strong>SADC</strong> REGION<br />

actual impact. (Still, policy changes that worsen pr<strong>of</strong>itability may provoke an immediate<br />

cessation <strong>of</strong> planned <strong>in</strong>vestments.)<br />

Second, recent models that highlight <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty show that <strong>in</strong>vestors may defer<br />

projects even if <strong>the</strong>y are fundamentally viable. Faced with substantial uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty about<br />

economic stability or <strong>the</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>of</strong> pro-<strong>in</strong>vestment policies, along with irreversible<br />

start-up costs, <strong>in</strong>vestors may choose to wait <strong>and</strong> see how events unfold before committ<strong>in</strong>g<br />

funds. Implicitly, <strong>the</strong>y dem<strong>and</strong> a higher hurdle rate consist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard UCC plus <strong>the</strong><br />

value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “option to wait.” 17 The result may be a very sluggish <strong>in</strong>vestment response. The<br />

antidote is to reduce uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty by establish<strong>in</strong>g a track record <strong>of</strong> dependable policy<br />

management <strong>and</strong> political stability.<br />

Third, liquidity constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>and</strong> imperfections <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial markets can enhance <strong>the</strong><br />

effectiveness <strong>of</strong> tax cuts. The neoclassical model assumes that <strong>in</strong>vestors have access to debt<br />

<strong>and</strong> equity f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g at a market-determ<strong>in</strong>ed cost <strong>of</strong> funds (adjusted for risk). This is a<br />

reasonable assumption for large mult<strong>in</strong>ational companies. But for many companies <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong><br />

source <strong>of</strong> funds for <strong>in</strong>vestment is reta<strong>in</strong>ed earn<strong>in</strong>gs. In this case, tax cuts can foster <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />

by augment<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> company’s net cash flow, provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> means to take advantage <strong>of</strong> viable<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment opportunities that o<strong>the</strong>rwise would be missed for lack <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance.<br />

ROLE OF INDIRECT TAXES<br />

How do <strong>in</strong>direct taxes such as import duties <strong>and</strong> VAT enter <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment decision? The usual premise is that a uniform tax on production or sales does not<br />

substantially affect <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong>centives because it is largely passed along to f<strong>in</strong>al consumers<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> higher product prices. However, <strong>in</strong>vestment behavior can be strongly<br />

<strong>in</strong>fluenced by differential <strong>in</strong>direct taxes which fall on some activities more than o<strong>the</strong>rs. For<br />

example, <strong>the</strong> common policy <strong>of</strong> impos<strong>in</strong>g lower import duty on <strong>in</strong>puts than on outputs<br />

enhances <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> import-substitution activities, stimulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestment that would<br />

o<strong>the</strong>rwise not be pr<strong>of</strong>itable or susta<strong>in</strong>able. (Chapter 3 discusses <strong>the</strong> economic efficiency cost <strong>of</strong><br />

this <strong>in</strong>vestment promotion policy.)<br />

Ano<strong>the</strong>r important <strong>in</strong>direct tax issue is <strong>the</strong> imposition <strong>of</strong> import duty or tax on <strong>the</strong> purchase<br />

<strong>of</strong> mach<strong>in</strong>ery <strong>and</strong> equipment. If this tax (tK) were fully passed along to consumers, <strong>the</strong>n it<br />

would not significantly affect <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it maximization decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestors. But it might not<br />

be passed through fully if <strong>the</strong> duty on compet<strong>in</strong>g imports <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al products rema<strong>in</strong>s<br />

unchanged, or if compet<strong>in</strong>g producers use more labor-<strong>in</strong>tensive production processes <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong>refore pay less <strong>of</strong> this tax. In <strong>the</strong>se cases, competition constra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> output price, so <strong>the</strong><br />

producer would bear <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>direct tax. The price <strong>of</strong> capital goods <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> model rises<br />

from PK to (1 + tK) PK. By <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> capital goods, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>direct tax on mach<strong>in</strong>ery<br />

17 See Hubbard (1994) for an excellent review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se “real option” models.

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