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Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC ...

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4-2 EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES IN THE <strong>SADC</strong> REGION<br />

18 percent after tax. From <strong>the</strong> equation: METR = (30-18)/30 = .40, or 40 percent. The METR <strong>of</strong><br />

40 percent <strong>in</strong>dicates that <strong>the</strong> tax system dim<strong>in</strong>ishes <strong>the</strong> real rate <strong>of</strong> return by 40 percent (<strong>in</strong> this<br />

case 12 percentage po<strong>in</strong>ts are lost out <strong>of</strong> 30).<br />

The METR shows how much <strong>the</strong> tax system distorts <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong>centives by driv<strong>in</strong>g a<br />

wedge between <strong>the</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> a project <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> after-tax return to <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>vestor. The METR can be compared across projects, sectors, <strong>and</strong> countries. The larger <strong>the</strong><br />

METR, <strong>the</strong> bigger <strong>the</strong> tax wedge. Differences <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> METR reveal tax-<strong>in</strong>duced biases <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>centives that drive <strong>the</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong> productive resources. In some cases <strong>the</strong> biases are<br />

deliberate aims <strong>of</strong> policy, such as preferences for agriculture or manufactur<strong>in</strong>g. In many cases,<br />

however, <strong>the</strong> biases are un<strong>in</strong>tended consequences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tax system.<br />

The tax wedge is normally positive, but it can be zero or negative. An <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g example <strong>of</strong> a<br />

METR = 0 is <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> full first-year expens<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> capital costs that are f<strong>in</strong>anced entirely with<br />

equity. To see this, consider <strong>the</strong> case where <strong>the</strong> before-tax rate <strong>of</strong> return on <strong>in</strong>vestment is<br />

expressed as follows:<br />

RORbt = Present discounted value <strong>of</strong> annual net earn<strong>in</strong>gs = PDV(E) (4.2)<br />

Capital expenditure K<br />

The company tax at rate u reduces <strong>the</strong> numerator to (1–u) * PDV(E), but full expens<strong>in</strong>g<br />

reduces <strong>the</strong> effective cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital expenditure to (1–u) * K. 46 Hence, <strong>the</strong> after-tax rate <strong>of</strong><br />

return is<br />

RORat = (1 – u) PDV(E) = PDV(E) = RORbt (4.3)<br />

(1 – u) K K<br />

which implies that METR = 0 despite <strong>the</strong> positive tax rate. In this case, <strong>the</strong> government shares<br />

equally <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital outlay (by allow<strong>in</strong>g a full deduction for <strong>the</strong> expense) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> annual<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>it (through <strong>the</strong> tax itself). Consequently, <strong>the</strong> tax system does not affect <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> return<br />

for by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestor or distort <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>centive to <strong>in</strong>vest. Note that government revenue is positive<br />

<strong>in</strong> this case as long as <strong>the</strong> project is pr<strong>of</strong>itable—that is, as long as PDV(E) > K. Thus, METR=0<br />

need not mean zero tax revenue. It simply <strong>in</strong>dicates that <strong>the</strong> revenue is derived <strong>in</strong> a manner<br />

that does not distort <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong>centives.<br />

Several <strong>SADC</strong> countries have adopted tax <strong>in</strong>centive programs that achieve METR = 0 simply<br />

by exempt<strong>in</strong>g projects from tax. But <strong>in</strong> this case, <strong>the</strong> company revenue yield from <strong>the</strong> projects<br />

46 Technically, this expression requires that tax losses can be claimed <strong>in</strong> cash or <strong>of</strong>fset aga<strong>in</strong>st earn<strong>in</strong>gs from<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r activities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> year <strong>the</strong>y accrue, ra<strong>the</strong>r than be<strong>in</strong>g carried forward. The simple formula given here also<br />

assumes that: <strong>the</strong> capital outlay is completed <strong>in</strong> year 0; <strong>the</strong>re is no tax on dividends; tax depreciation equals<br />

economic depreciation; <strong>the</strong>re is no import duty on capital goods; <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>re is no tax on capital ga<strong>in</strong>s (or no<br />

capital ga<strong>in</strong> to tax).

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