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Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC ...

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XV<br />

screen<strong>in</strong>g criteria; benefits <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>itial capital allowance that is valuable to<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestors while still generat<strong>in</strong>g revenue; explicit limits on <strong>the</strong> budgetary cost; transparent<br />

procedures; <strong>and</strong> “clawback” provisions penaliz<strong>in</strong>g beneficiaries who do not deliver results.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>stitutional framework for tax <strong>in</strong>centive programs (i.e., policy objectives, procedures,<br />

<strong>and</strong> systems for enhanc<strong>in</strong>g transparency) is weak <strong>in</strong> most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> region. In addition, most<br />

Member States face critical fiscal constra<strong>in</strong>ts, imply<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>y should be very cautious<br />

about <strong>the</strong> revenue risks associated with generous <strong>in</strong>centives. The st<strong>and</strong>ard company tax rates<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region range from 25 to 40 percent, cluster<strong>in</strong>g around 30 to 35 percent. The comb<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

burden <strong>of</strong> company tax plus dividend tax is lowest <strong>in</strong> Mauritius <strong>and</strong> Botswana <strong>and</strong> highest <strong>in</strong><br />

Zambia <strong>and</strong> DRC.<br />

To assess <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard tax system <strong>in</strong> each <strong>SADC</strong> country, we evaluate <strong>the</strong> METR tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to<br />

account <strong>the</strong> tax on company <strong>in</strong>come, dividends <strong>and</strong> capital ga<strong>in</strong>s, as well as depreciation<br />

allowances, <strong>and</strong> loss carry-forward provisions. Under four illustrative project scenarios, <strong>the</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ard tax system <strong>in</strong> Mauritius <strong>of</strong>fers <strong>the</strong> lowest METR to <strong>in</strong>vestors. Namibia <strong>and</strong> Botswana<br />

also <strong>of</strong>fer st<strong>and</strong>ard tax codes with METRs under 35 percent. In contrast, <strong>the</strong> METR is above 50<br />

percent for <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard tax system <strong>in</strong> Angola, DRC, Mozambique, Swazil<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />

Zimbabwe.<br />

We next compare <strong>the</strong> tax <strong>in</strong>centive regimes by calculat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> METR for <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> a foreignowned<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment manufactur<strong>in</strong>g for export. <strong>Tax</strong> concessions produce a large reduction <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> METR <strong>in</strong> most states, except Angola <strong>and</strong> Botswana where <strong>the</strong> differential is relatively<br />

small. A large reduction <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> METR may have a significant positive impact on <strong>the</strong> economy<br />

if <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>centives are well targeted, effectively adm<strong>in</strong>istered, <strong>and</strong> complemented by o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

favorable <strong>in</strong>vestment policies. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, <strong>the</strong>y may simply lead to a misallocation <strong>of</strong><br />

resources <strong>and</strong> a large revenue loss.<br />

Conclusions <strong>and</strong> Recommendations<br />

On <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> our review <strong>of</strong> how <strong>in</strong>vestment tax <strong>in</strong>centives work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> practice, as<br />

well as <strong>the</strong>ir economic advantages <strong>and</strong> disadvantages, we conclude that<br />

•<br />

•<br />

•<br />

•<br />

Non-tax elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment climate are far more important than tax <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>in</strong><br />

determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> level <strong>and</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment flows;<br />

The effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>centives on productivity <strong>and</strong> efficiency is at least as important as <strong>the</strong> effect<br />

on <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment;<br />

Investment tax <strong>in</strong>centives may work well <strong>in</strong> some contexts but <strong>the</strong>y work poorly <strong>in</strong> many<br />

o<strong>the</strong>rs; decisions about tax <strong>in</strong>centives must be country specific;<br />

The benefits <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment tax <strong>in</strong>centives are widely exaggerated, while <strong>the</strong> costs are <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

underestimated or overlooked altoge<strong>the</strong>r; <strong>and</strong><br />

• Capacity build<strong>in</strong>g to streng<strong>the</strong>n tax policy analysis should be a central priority.

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