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Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC ...

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2-10 EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES IN THE <strong>SADC</strong> REGION<br />

A major review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> literature on <strong>in</strong>vestment behavior a decade ago, by Chir<strong>in</strong>ko (1993),<br />

reported that variables reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> UCC, which <strong>in</strong>cludes tax effects, had only a small effect<br />

on <strong>in</strong>vestment. In contrast, output variables had a large effect, <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with <strong>the</strong> accelerator<br />

model discussed above. But Chir<strong>in</strong>ko also concluded that <strong>in</strong>vestment models <strong>in</strong> general<br />

produced weak results. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> studies exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this survey used macroeconomic data<br />

for estimat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestment functions. Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most important lesson from this early work<br />

is that one does not get strong <strong>and</strong> consistent results about <strong>in</strong>vestment behavior from<br />

macroeconomic models.<br />

To overcome this problem many researchers have begun to use microeconomic data, which<br />

produces a far larger sample size <strong>and</strong> more discern<strong>in</strong>g statistical tests. These papers generally<br />

f<strong>in</strong>d that variables reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> UCC, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g tax effects, are statistically significant <strong>and</strong><br />

quantitatively important as determ<strong>in</strong>ants <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment. Zee et al. (2002) cite several estimates<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elasticity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment with respect to <strong>the</strong> UCC <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> -0.5 to -1.0. This means<br />

that a 10 per cent reduction <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> UCC, due to lower f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g costs or tax benefits, tends to<br />

<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong>vestment by 5-10 per cent. This is a large impact. 20 Look<strong>in</strong>g more specifically at<br />

evidence for develop<strong>in</strong>g countries, however, <strong>the</strong> same paper reaches <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g conclusion:<br />

The ma<strong>in</strong> messages <strong>of</strong> this research are that tax <strong>in</strong>centives can stimulate <strong>in</strong>vestment,<br />

but that a country’s overall economic characteristics may be more important for <strong>the</strong><br />

success or <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustries than any tax <strong>in</strong>centives package; <strong>and</strong> even if tax<br />

<strong>in</strong>centives stimulate <strong>in</strong>vestment, <strong>the</strong>y are not generally cost effective. 21<br />

Here <strong>the</strong> statement that <strong>in</strong>centives are not “cost effective” means that <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong><br />

additional <strong>in</strong>vestment is less than <strong>the</strong> estimated revenue loss. In this sense, cost-effectiveness<br />

appears to vary widely by <strong>the</strong> type <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>and</strong> by <strong>the</strong> tax <strong>in</strong>strument used (Shah 1995).<br />

General tax reductions appear to be less cost-effective than <strong>in</strong>centives tied directly to new<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment because a large part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> revenue loss <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> former case benefits exist<strong>in</strong>g capital.<br />

Also, R&D <strong>in</strong>vestment appears to be more sensitive to tax <strong>in</strong>centives than o<strong>the</strong>r types <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment.<br />

Numerous studies focus on <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ants <strong>of</strong> FDI, <strong>in</strong> particular, us<strong>in</strong>g firm-level data or<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternational cross-section <strong>and</strong> time-series data. Much <strong>of</strong> this research f<strong>in</strong>ds significant effects<br />

<strong>of</strong> both host-country <strong>and</strong> home-country tax parameters. Also, FDI seems to be gett<strong>in</strong>g more<br />

tax-sensitive over time as capital has become more mobile <strong>and</strong> production more global.<br />

Bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, though, that <strong>the</strong> data <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> results are dom<strong>in</strong>ated by FDI flows between<br />

<strong>in</strong>dustrial countries. As OECD countries have become more homogenous <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure,<br />

returns from <strong>in</strong>vestment, or high trade taxes that distort <strong>the</strong> trade regime, or simply <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> a large<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>trusive government sector.<br />

20 In a widely cited study <strong>of</strong> FDI determ<strong>in</strong>ants, which focuses on corruption, Wei (2000) f<strong>in</strong>ds highly significant<br />

effects <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> statutory tax rate <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> average effective tax rate. His famous conclusion: “An <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong><br />

corruption from <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore level to <strong>the</strong> Mexico level would have <strong>the</strong> same negative effect on <strong>in</strong>ward FDI<br />

as rais<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> corporate <strong>in</strong>come tax rate by eighteen percentage po<strong>in</strong>ts.”<br />

21 Zee et al., 2002, p.1508

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