credits bmbl December 7 '06.doc - Central Michigan University

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Agent Summary Statements – Viral Agents Potentially infected tissue samples should be handled in BSL-2 facilities following BSL-3 practices and procedures. Cell-culture virus propagation and purification should be carried out in a BSL-3 facility using BSL-3 practices, containment equipment and procedures. Experimentally infected rodent species known not to excrete the virus can be housed in ABSL-2 facilities using ABSL-2 practices and procedures. Primary physical containment devices including BSCs should be used whenever procedures with potential for generating aerosols are conducted. Serum or tissue samples from potentially infected rodents should be handled at BSL-2 using BSL-3 practices, containment equipment and procedures. All work involving inoculation of virus-containing samples into rodent species permissive for chronic infection should be conducted at ABSL-4. SPECIAL ISSUES Transfer of Agent Importation of this agent may require CDC and/or USDA importation permits. Domestic transport of this agent may require a permit from USDA/APHIS/VS. Agent: Hendra virus (formerly known as Equine Morbillivirus) and Nipah Virus Hendra virus and Nipah virus are members of a newly recognized genus called Henipavirus, within the family Paramyxoviridae. Outbreaks of a previously unrecognized paramyxovirus, at first called equine morbillivirus, later named Hendra virus, occurred in horses in Australia in 1994 and 1995. During 1998-1999, an outbreak of illness caused by a similar but distinct virus, now known as Nipah virus, occurred in Malaysia and Singapore. Human illness, characterized by fever, severe headache, myalgia and signs of encephalitis occurred in individuals in close contact with pigs (i.e., pig farmers and abattoir workers). 10-14 A few patients developed a respiratory disease. Approximately 40% of patients with encephalitis died. Recently, cases of Nipah virus infection were described in Bangladesh, apparently the result of close contact with infected fruit bats without an intermediate (e.g., pig) host. Occupational Infections No laboratory-acquired infections are known to have occurred as a result of Hendra or Nipah virus exposure; however, three people in close contact with ill horses developed encephalitis or respiratory disease and two died. 15-20 Natural Modes of Infection The natural reservoir hosts for the Hendra and Nipah viruses appear to be fruit bats of the genus Pteropus. 21-23 Studies suggest that a locally occurring member of the genus, Pteropus giganteus, is the reservoir for the virus in Bangladesh. 24 Individuals who 216
Agent Summary Statements – Viral Agents had regular contact with bats had no evidence of infection (antibody) in one study in Australia. 25 LABORATORY SAFETY The exact mode of transmission of these viruses has not been established. Most clinical cases to date have been associated with close contact with horses, their blood or body fluids (Australia) or pigs (Malaysia/Singapore) but presumed direct transmission from Pteropus bats has been recorded in Bangladesh. Hendra and Nipah viruses have been isolated from tissues of infected animals. In the outbreaks in Malaysia and Singapore, viral antigen was found in central nervous system, kidney and lung tissues of fatal human cases 26 and virus was present in secretions of patients, albeit at low levels. 27 Active surveillance for infection of healthcare workers in Malaysia has not detected evidence of occupationally-acquired infections in this setting. 28 Containment Recommendations Because of the unknown risks to laboratory workers and the potential impact on indigenous livestock should the virus escape a diagnostic or research laboratory, health officials and laboratory managers should evaluate the need to work with the virus and the containment capability of the facility before undertaking any work with Hendra, Nipah or suspected related viruses. BSL-4 is required for all work with these viruses. Once a diagnosis of Nipah or Hendra virus is suspected, all diagnostic specimens also must be handled at BSL-4. ABSL-4 is required for any work with infected animals. SPECIAL ISSUES Select Agent Hendra and Nipah virus are Select Agents requiring registration with CDC and/or USDA for possession, use, storage and/or transfer. See Appendix F for additional information. Transfer of Agent Importation of this agent may require CDC and/or USDA importation permits. Domestic transport of this agent may require a permit from USDA/APHIS/VS. A DoC permit may be required for the export of this agent to another country. See Appendix C for additional information. Agent: Hepatitis A Virus, Hepatitis E Virus Hepatitis A virus is a positive single-stranded RNA virus, the type species of the Hepatovirus genus in the family Picornaviridae. Hepatitis E virus is a positive singlestranded RNA virus, the type species of the genus Hepevirus, a floating genus not assigned to any family. Occupational Infections 217
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Biosafety in Microbiological and Bi
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SECTION VIII-H: Prion Diseases 299
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Forward Biosafety in Microbiologica
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Editors: L. Casey Chosewood, MD Dir
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Guest Editors: Matthew J. Arduino,
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Charles B. Millard, PhD Lieutenant
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Robert Bull Karen B. Byers Jane Cap
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Thomas L. Miller Douglas M. Moore M
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Robert Yarchoan Uri Yokel Lisa Youn
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Introduction laboratories chose not
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Introduction RISK CRITERIA FOR ESTA
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Introduction BMBL includes an impor
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Section II Biological Risk Assessme
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Biological Risk Assessment informat
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Biological Risk Assessment The NIH
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Biological Risk Assessment effectiv
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Biological Risk Assessment Third, m
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Biological Risk Assessment 14. Oxma
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Principles of Biosafety Safety equi
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Principles of Biosafety Often an in
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Principles of Biosafety Four standa
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Principles of Biosafety 4. Centers
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Laboratory Biosafety Level Criteria
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Section V Vertebrate Animal Biosafe
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Vertebrate Animal Biosafety Level C
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TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED BIOS
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Principles of Laboratory Biosecurit
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Occupational Health and Immunoproph
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Agent Summary Statements - Bacteria
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• Section VIII-G: Toxin Agents Se
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Agent Summary Statements - Toxins i
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Agent Summary Statements - Toxins A
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Agent Summary Statements - Toxins L
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• Section VIII-H: Prion Diseases
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Agent Summary Statement - Prion Dis
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Appendix A Proper maintenance of ca
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Appendix A declined. However, in ma
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Appendix A It is possible to exhaus
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Appendix A 4. The Class II, Type A2
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Appendix A prohibited. Furthermore,
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Appendix A plastic wrappers, pipett
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Appendix A touch-plate microburners
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Appendix A SECTION VI FACILITY AND
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Appendix A Development of Containme
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Appendix A C. Airflow Smoke Pattern
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Appendix A TABLES Table 1. Selectio
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Appendix A Table 3. Field Performan
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Appendix A FIGURES Figure 1. HEPA f
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Appendix A Figure 3. The Class II,
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Appendix A Figure 5B. The Class II,
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Appendix A Figure 8. The Class III
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Appendix A Figure 9B. The vertical
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Appendix A Figure 11. A typical lay
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Appendix A REFERENCES 1. Centers fo
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Appendix B Decontamination and Disi
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Appendix B surfaces are contaminate
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Appendix B TABLE 1 DESCENDING ORDER
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Appendix B dioxide gas exits the ge
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Appendix B d The effectiveness of a
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Appendix C Transportation of Infect
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Appendix C 1600 Clifton Road, N.E.,
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Appendix C disease in humans or in
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Appendix C Biological specimen, Cat
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Appendix D Agriculture Pathogen Bio
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Appendix D simultaneous opening of
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Appendix D 14. Pathological inciner
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Appendix D Wastes and other materia
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Appendix D Camelpox virus b a, b, c
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Appendix D SPECIAL ISSUES The impor
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Appendix D required by the USDA and
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Appendix D depression, anorexia, an
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Appendix D laboratory with enhancem
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Appendix D five day period of conta
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Appendix D slaughterhouses or indus
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Appendix D virus does not cause any
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Appendix D NDV is classified in the
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Appendix D movement permit is requi
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Appendix D Spring Viremia of Carp V
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Appendix D REFERENCES 1. Hess WR. A
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Appendix D 37. Alexander DJ. Newcas
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Appendix E Arthropod Containment Gu
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Appendix F Select Agents and Toxins
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Appendix G IPM issues and requireme
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Appendix H Working with Human, NHP
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Appendix I Guidelines for Work with
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decontaminated periodically, for ex
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0.25N, and/or sodium hypochlorite (
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k Irradiation causes a dose-depende
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7. Morin R, Kozlovac J. Biological
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Appendix J NIH Oversight of Researc
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Appendix K Resources for Informatio
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Appendix K E-mail: http://www2.gsu.
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Appendix K and http://www.who.int/c
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Appendix L HEPA High Efficiency Par
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