Participation and Democracy: Dynamics, Causes ... - Jacobs University

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that someone will participate in elite-challenging activities. These odds (or chances) are defined as P/(1-P), i.e. the probability (that someone participates, so ‘an event will occur’) divided by one minus the probability (that someone does not participate, so ‘an event will not occur’). The β 0i coefficient is the individual-level intercept, the other beta coefficients in the model are the individual-level effects (slopes). Finally, r ij represents the error term in this model. The main goal of a multilevel analysis is “to account for variance in a dependent variable that is measured at the lowest level of analysis by considering information from all levels of analysis” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219). The information from the subordinate level, the societal level, is taken into account in the next two steps. Here, it is assumed that level-2 variables can have direct effects (Model 2) but may also mediate the effects of level-1 predictors (Model 3). In the second step of analyzing multilevel data, level-2 variables are introduced to estimate their independent effects on the individual-level intercept β 0j . In Model 2, the level-2 variables are (1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Democracy Stock, (3) GDP per capita, (4) Tertiarization, (5) Inequality, (6) Happiness level, and (7) Parliamentary system. The variable Electoral system (Proportional system) was excluded from analysis, as the predictor did not have a significant effect on the level of elite-challenging participation (see T-test in Table 8-3a) and was insignificant even when introduced as the only predictor for individual-level participation in the multilevel model. The model for the context factors looks as follows: Model 2: β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Voice and Accountability j ) + γ 02 (Democracy Stock j ) + γ 03 (GDP per capita j ) + γ 04 (Tertiarization j ) + γ 05 (Inequality j ) + γ 06 (Happiness level j) + γ 07 (Parliamentary system j ) + u ij . In the equation, γ 00 is the societal level intercept, the other γ coefficients are level-2 effects on the level-1 intercept β 0j . The level-2 error term is summarized in u ij . With eight individual-level and seven context factors, the problem of multicollinearity must be addressed before we begin with the statistical analysis. Multicollinearity is a 156
well-known phenomenon in regression analysis, and it also poses a serious challenge when applying multi-level models. In short, it refers to a considerable correlation among the independent variables, which leads most likely to an unreliable estimation of effects. In a multilevel analysis, multicollinearity can occur among predictors of the same level, or between an interaction effect and a level-1 and/or level-2 predictor. Looking at the variables in the Models 1 and 2, collinearity among variables seems to be unavoidable: a central finding in participation research, for example, is the correlation between education and political interest. At the aggregate level, Seymour Martin Lipset’s central claim of modernization theory – “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” (Lipset 1959: 75) – suggests a strong correlation between the World Bank’s governance indicators and a country’s economic development. Table 8- 4 documents the correlation coefficients among the level-2 predictors, suggesting a multicollinearity problem also at the aggregate level. Correlations are most pronounced between the level-2 variables and economic development (GDP per capita) as well as the democracy measures: Table 8-4: Correlation Effects Among Level-2 Variables V & A Dem. Stock GDP per capita Happiness Parliamenta. Proportional Inequality Tertiarization Voice and Accountability -- .71 *** .59 *** .55 *** .27 * .81 *** -.41 *** .56 *** Democracy Stock .71 *** -- .72 *** .52 *** .01 .78 *** -.12 .69 *** Happiness Level .59 *** .72 *** -- .31 ** .17 .63 *** .10 .61 *** Regime Type: Parliamentarism .55 *** .52 *** .31 ** -- .00 .55 *** -.46 *** .11 Proportional System .27 * .01 .17 .00 -- .17 .26 * .09 GDP per capita .81 *** .78 *** .63 *** .55 *** .17 -- -.39 *** .61 *** Inequality (Gini coefficient) -.41 *** -.12 *** .10 -.46 *** -.26 * -.39 *** -- .07 Tertiarization .56 *** .69 *** .61 *** .14 .09 .61 *** .07 -- N=78. Data entries are Pearson’s r. The problem of multicollinearity in the multilevel model becomes evident when introducing the level-2 predictors to the multilevel model: When each factor is entered 157
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Participation and Democracy: Dynami
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Declaration: I herewith declare tha
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C Empirical Analyses 5 “The Rise
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Figures and Tables Figure 2-1 Chang
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Figure 9-3 Figure 9-4 Elite-Challen
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Introduction “The effective isola
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forms of participation as elite-cha
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attempts to link the different appr
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Section B then outlines the methodo
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A THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS The th
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citizens think that national govern
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citizens used SMS to keep informed
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2. Theoretical Framework: What Expl
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has impacted generations of academi
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28-29). The experience of these act
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in mass-based, hierarchical organiz
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Figure 2-1: Change in Party Members
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in the context of the movements the
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It is therefore no wonder that the
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that some fundamental social and cu
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constitutions: universal suffrage,
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of political activism in general an
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political consumerism) as the consc
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“subjective political competence
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have differentiated between two typ
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For the design of an empirical part
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general, political participation sh
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mobilization capacity. As these org
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(1) Resources: Participants in elit
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Hypotheses on the aggregate level:
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To measure participation in elite-c
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authors have demonstrated how a com
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different countries and languages.
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of law, scholars became more and mo
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Table 4-1: Democratic Societies Inc
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The empirical analyses exclude soci
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Will you please place each of the l
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European Social Survey The European
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and actual participation has not na
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In a first step, the single items i
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Figure 5-1: Participation in Elite-
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increase as national income rises.
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Once again, with almost two thirds
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The societies in Europe show differ
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attack. These massive demonstration
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5.2 Trends in Elite-Challenging Act
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societies were split into English-s
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However, Figure 5-9 reveals that th
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expectancy declined (in particular
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6. Common Patterns of Complement or
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If it was true that elite-challengi
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Figure 6-1: Elite-Challenging Activ
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This conclusion is supported by the
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Table 6-2: Individual-Level Correla
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democracy alive at the very grassro
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participation in citizen action gro
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interest organizations than the one
Page 115 and 116: Figure 6-5 takes up the trend depic
Page 117 and 118: 7. Down and Down We Go? Social Capi
Page 119 and 120: enough to stimulate people into act
Page 121 and 122: The European Social Survey (ESS 200
Page 123 and 124: a member of one single organization
Page 125 and 126: associations. Social activity in Eu
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Page 129 and 130: Figure 7-5: Informal Networks in Eu
Page 131 and 132: Table 7-2: Individual-Level Correla
Page 133 and 134: Figure 7-6: Trust Level and Elite-C
Page 135 and 136: generalized horizontal trust also p
Page 137 and 138: Table 7-4 presents two separate reg
Page 139 and 140: Summarizing the results so far, eli
Page 141 and 142: Model 3: β 1j = γ 10 + γ 11 (Mem
Page 143 and 144: Table 7-5: Multi-Level (Hierarchica
Page 145 and 146: 8. Individual Characteristics or Co
Page 147 and 148: activities over the past decades sh
Page 149 and 150: (2) Conventional Participation Poli
Page 151 and 152: Table 8-2: Binary-Logistic Regressi
Page 153 and 154: the chances to participate in elite
Page 155 and 156: able to participate in selecting th
Page 157 and 158: Figure 8-2: 1.0 Elite-Challenging A
Page 159 and 160: Inequality: Gini coefficient The in
Page 161 and 162: Figure 8-5: 1.0 Elite-Challenging A
Page 163 and 164: assess the formal structure of a de
Page 165: 8.3 The Multilevel Model: What Dete
Page 169 and 170: to replace the five single predicto
Page 171 and 172: The intraclass correlation coeffici
Page 173 and 174: Table 8-5: Multi-Level Model (HGLM)
Page 175 and 176: European societies only. The effect
Page 177 and 178: 9. Elite-Challenging Activities and
Page 179 and 180: for both scales are derived. Accord
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Page 183 and 184: 9.1.2 Measures of Elite Integrity a
Page 185 and 186: Figure 9-4: Elite-Challenging Activ
Page 187 and 188: Table 9-1: Zero-Order and Partial C
Page 189 and 190: the ideal citizen voices his or her
Page 191 and 192: Continued: “Having democratic rul
Page 193 and 194: Table 9-3: Individual-Level Correla
Page 195 and 196: political interest is a dominant fa
Page 197 and 198: Continued: Interest in Politics (Pe
Page 199 and 200: participation in elite-challenging
Page 201 and 202: Continued: Tolerance towards foreig
Page 203 and 204: The results in Table 9-6 show that
Page 205 and 206: signing petitions. Major accounts o
Page 207 and 208: Causes of elite-challenging activit
Page 209 and 210: public behavior. The elite-challeng
Page 211 and 212: Bibliography Abramson, Paul R. (199
Page 213 and 214: Dahl, Robert D. (1971): Polyarchy:
Page 215 and 216: Dickerson, Mark and Thomas Flanagan
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Gerring, John, Philip Bond, William
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Huntington, Samuel P. (2000): Forew
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Karatnycky, Adrian (1999): The Decl
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Lenski, Gerhard E. (1954): Status C
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McCarthy, John D., Clark McPhail, J
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Peters, B. Guy (1998): Comparative
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Rucht, Dieter and Thomas Ohlemacher
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Stolle, Dietlind (2001): Clubs and
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Van Deth, Jan W. (1998a): Equivalen
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Associations and Political Involvem
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Checklist 1: Criteria for evaluatin
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G) Personal Autonomy and Individual
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1981 1982 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1
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1981 1982 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1
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1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 199
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Appendix A4-4: Internal Consistency
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Appendix A5-2: Elite-Challenging Ac
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Appendix A6-2: Individual-Level Cor
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Appendix A6-4: Factor Analysis: Unp
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Continued (1)… Social activities
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Continued (3)… Social activities
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Appendix A7-3: Social Trust in Euro
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Appendix A7-5: Stepwise Multi-Level
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Continued (2)…. Gender * Societal
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Gender (percent valid) Age (percent
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Political interest (percent valid)
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Appendix A8-4: Alternative Multi-Le
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Appendix A9-1: Elite-Challenging Ac
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Appendix A9-3: Individual-level Cor
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Appendix A9-4: Factor Analysis: Ess
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Continued: People with a different
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Finland (n=1224) 1,1 11,9 28,1 51,3
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World Values Survey/European Values
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Greece (n= 1142) 48,4 37,5 11,7 Gua
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Slovakia (n*=1136) 34,8 31,9 18,1 (
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Joining in Boycotts 1981 1990 1999-
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Guatemala (n= 1000) 1,2 8,8 85,5 Hu
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Slovenia (n= 1035) 6,4 37,ß 36,8 (
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Attending Lawful Demonstrations 198
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Greece (n= 1142) 46,1 37,1 13,7 Gua
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Slovakia (n*=1602) 19,3 47,0 21,1 (
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Joining Unofficial Strikes 1981 199
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Italy (n= 1348) 2,3 8,0 83,4 (n= 20
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Venezuela (n= 1200) 2,4 6,1 87,9 Vi
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Croatia (n= 1003) 0,7 16,6 73,3 Cze
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Peru (n= 1501) 1,6 11,5 80,7 Philip
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European Social Survey 2002 and 200
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Netherlands (n=2364) 22,3 77,2 23,4
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Denmark (n=1506) 22,8 76,8 28,2 71,
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Participated in illegal protest act
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