Public Management and Administration - Owen E.hughes
Public Management and Administration - Owen E.hughes
Public Management and Administration - Owen E.hughes
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For a start, it seems too much to claim that the existence of groups was itself<br />
an explanation <strong>and</strong> a justification of democracy. Also, it seems unrealistic to<br />
argue that government is only a byst<strong>and</strong>er, an umpire with no views of its own.<br />
Pluralism has trouble explaining the fact that groups are not equal, or that some<br />
groups always have the ear of government while others are ignored. As long as<br />
pluralism is considered to be operant – government acts as the passive arbiter<br />
of interest groups – there should be no particular problem in effectively delegating<br />
policy-making to outside groups. However, if government is not a passive<br />
arbiter between groups, or if some groups always dominate others, the<br />
quality of policy-making may suffer from being left to interest groups.<br />
There are similar problems if the relationship between government <strong>and</strong><br />
groups fits a corporatist model of interest group behaviour. The theory of corporatism<br />
argues that there is a cooperative relationship between government<br />
agencies <strong>and</strong> the interest group or groups representing the major beneficiaries;<br />
this is usually seen as an agreement between big business, big labour <strong>and</strong> government.<br />
Although the idea fits some countries at some times – for example,<br />
Germany in much of the postwar period – corporatism as a theory has probably<br />
declined in recent years. Big business, big government <strong>and</strong> big labour no<br />
longer represent that much of a society <strong>and</strong> rarely do their interests seem in<br />
concert compared with the society as a whole. Even where corporatist explanations<br />
have seemed plausible, they have tended to fall down when more traditional<br />
links between the three actors came into play, or as Dunleavy argues:<br />
‘corporatism’s difficulties remain primarily empirical – the fact that many large<br />
liberal democracies fit poorly with the immanent trend it identifies’ (1991,<br />
p. 43). Also, agreement between these three large groups is not necessarily in<br />
the interests of society as a whole. It could, for instance, disregard the interests<br />
of consumers, small business or workers who are not in unions.<br />
Pluralism <strong>and</strong> corporatism may be regarded favourably, <strong>and</strong>, if they are,<br />
there would be no problem with a close relationship between groups <strong>and</strong><br />
bureaucracy. However, it can be argued that the interaction or over-reliance on<br />
groups might lead to inferior policy outcomes.<br />
Is group competition harmful?<br />
Managing External Constituencies 213<br />
Allowing policy to be made by groups could arguably make government less<br />
effective. There are arguments that group competition is harmful to society as<br />
a whole <strong>and</strong> the functioning of the political system. In different ways, although<br />
both are from ‘rational choice’ economic theory (see Chapter 4), Olson <strong>and</strong><br />
Stigler argue that interest groups may cause undesirable policy outcomes.<br />
Olson argued (1965, 1982) that pluralism is illogical <strong>and</strong> the pluralist view<br />
is ‘fundamentally flawed’. Potential groups would not necessarily arise into<br />
actual groups, as the organizer of a large group will not gain a large share of<br />
the benefit of a policy change when compared to the costs of organization in<br />
both time <strong>and</strong> effort. Instead of large groups being more important <strong>and</strong> more