Public Management and Administration - Owen E.hughes
Public Management and Administration - Owen E.hughes
Public Management and Administration - Owen E.hughes
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theoretical arguments. It is also easier to deregulate, as capture theory predicts that<br />
any government regulation or regulatory agency will only make matters worse.<br />
Political leaders can declare they will not be captive to special interests <strong>and</strong> can<br />
use these arguments to cut their power.<br />
The importance of theory for policy<br />
Interest group theory has implications for the work of public managers. Reich<br />
argues that there are two related but conceptually distinct ‘procedural visions’<br />
of how public managers should decide what to do: the first being ‘interest<br />
group mediation’ <strong>and</strong> the second being ‘maximizing net benefits’ (1988,<br />
p. 129). For the public manager, interest group mediation is as ‘a referee, an<br />
intermediary, a skilful practitioner of negotiation <strong>and</strong> compromise’ (1988,<br />
p. 129): in other words, this model is clearly related to pluralism.<br />
Net benefit maximization is more analytical, related to decision theory <strong>and</strong><br />
microeconomics. According to Reich (1988, p. 132):<br />
Here the public manager was less a referee than an analyst. His responsibilities were,<br />
first, to determine that the market had somehow failed <strong>and</strong> that intervention might<br />
improve overall efficiency; second, to structure the decision-making process so as to<br />
make explicit the public problem at issue, alternative means of remedying it, <strong>and</strong> the consequences<br />
<strong>and</strong> tradeoffs associated with each solution; <strong>and</strong> third, to choose the policy<br />
option yielding the highest net benefits – where there was the greatest social utility.<br />
Reich argues that in practice there has been an amalgam between the two <strong>and</strong><br />
advocates more public meetings <strong>and</strong> deliberations. But there is a problem in<br />
allowing interest groups to have a greater role: public policies are more likely<br />
to be characterized by interest group mediation – pluralism – rather than consideration<br />
of net benefits, a school in which both Olson <strong>and</strong> Stigler would find<br />
themselves as would other ‘rational’ policy analysts.<br />
Problems with the external constituency function<br />
Managing External Constituencies 215<br />
It has been argued that, unlike the traditional model of administration, public<br />
sector managers are now active participants in the external relations of their<br />
department or agency. There is a trend towards an active partnership between<br />
interest groups <strong>and</strong> the bureaucracy, a relationship in which each party needs<br />
the other. For the most part these have been beneficial changes, but not without<br />
some problems.<br />
There are potential problems of accountability, as discussed in Chapter 13.<br />
When the politicians were nominally responsible for any problem arising from<br />
outside relationships, at least there was someone to blame. There may be gaps<br />
in the accountability system with the changes described here, because accountability<br />
can be evaded altogether. If a problem arises from the bureaucracy’s