Public Management and Administration - Owen E.hughes
Public Management and Administration - Owen E.hughes
Public Management and Administration - Owen E.hughes
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226 <strong>Public</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Administration</strong><br />
different models of economic development followed in Tanzania, India,<br />
Pakistan or the Pacific, the familiar precepts of a Weberian system were to be<br />
found.<br />
Development administration largely faded as a specialty within public<br />
administration in the mid-1970s as its theories <strong>and</strong> assumptions came under<br />
attack (Turner <strong>and</strong> Hulme, 1997, pp. 12–17). This occurred well before the rise<br />
of new public management in the West. A similar kind of demise had befallen its<br />
allied discipline, development economics (Krugman, 1995). There were intellectual<br />
problems in trying to carve out a separate specialty <strong>and</strong> at times the arguments<br />
between different theorists seemed to ignore the fact that there were real<br />
problems in the administration of developing countries.<br />
Problems of the administrative model<br />
The traditional model of administration did not serve developing countries particularly<br />
well. Features which worked in the West, notably political neutrality <strong>and</strong><br />
incorruptibility, were not followed in the Third World <strong>and</strong> the bureaucracy, while<br />
maintaining the appearance <strong>and</strong> institutions of traditional bureaucracy, served<br />
particular elite, ethnic or religious interests. Above all, it served itself. While<br />
there is some argument about the model of public choice as applied to the<br />
bureaucracy in the West, in the developing world it could scarcely be denied<br />
that bureaucrats looked after their own interests first. Also, it was rare that the<br />
performance of public services was evaluated in a systematic way <strong>and</strong> there<br />
were manifest problems of accountability with no-one taking the responsibility<br />
for negative outcomes.<br />
How much of the problem can be attributed to the bureaucratic model itself?<br />
It could be argued that what was happening was not the problem of the model,<br />
but was due to its precepts being perverted, as exemplified by the problem of<br />
corruption. While this is possible, it is more the case that the flaws in the model<br />
were exacerbated in developing countries. It was always a naïve to think that<br />
bureaucrats would be impersonal, neutral arbiters <strong>and</strong> not involved in either<br />
politics or looking after themselves. The problems could be argued about in<br />
developed countries; in developing countries their effects could be seen in corruption<br />
<strong>and</strong> other forms of self-enrichment. While not unknown in developed<br />
countries, problems of corruption were worse in developing ones. As Huque<br />
argues (1996, p. 23):<br />
<strong>Public</strong> administration itself is susceptible to corruption since officials exercise a substantial<br />
amount of power. There are possibilities for acquiring improper benefits by interpreting<br />
or bending rules in favour of certain groups or individuals. All governments seek<br />
to have in place a number of safeguards for deterring <strong>and</strong> dealing with corruption within<br />
administrative agencies. At the same time, public administration has to develop ways <strong>and</strong><br />
means to prevent <strong>and</strong> detect corruption in other sections of society. Much of the benefit<br />
of rapid economic growth or a stable political order may be lost in the growing tide of<br />
corruption.