Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

88 Andrew Geddes
towards diversity, multiplicity and differentiation. In turn, this implies that the
EU must embrace alternatives to absolute sovereignty that involve overlapping
authority, multiple cultural identities and flexible institutional arrangements in
order to promote free movement within and across its borders. As such, the post-
Westphalian state is redundant and new forms of neo-medievalism become the
appropriate response (see also Caporaso 1996).
Leaving aside the point that this vision of multiplicity and overlapping spheres
is likely to strike fear into the hearts of EU lawyers, the question that this chapter
discusses is the relationship between this vision of a progressive ‘neo-medievalism’
and the protection of the rights of migrants and ethnic minorities. It is argued that
these people are typically in a structurally weak position and that they are likely
to be in the frontline if scapegoats are needed to be blamed for the uncertainty
and insecurity that some people may feel in the face of some aspects of the
multiplicity and heterogeneity associated with European integration. In this context
it is argued that some good old-fashioned legal certainty in the form of EU
anti-discrimination legislation that directly binds member states is a necessary
accompaniment to a wider and deeper EU. The chapter now moves on to discuss
the development of EU legislation that protects migrant and minority rights and the
forms of mobilisation that have developed around these issues at European level.
Pro-migrant mobilisation in the EU
Since the 1990s it has been possible to identify new forms of political mobilisation
around migrant and minority rights issues at EU level. This is not ethnic mobilisation
as such in the sense that it represents direct mobilisation by Europe’s
immigrant and ethnic minority populations. Rather, this form of action can best
be understood as a form of interest co-option by EU institutions coupled with
entrepreneurialism by pro-migrant groups which thus conforms with the more
general pattern of interest group activity at EU level (Geddes 2000b). In the area
of international migration many of the groups that have been particularly active
(the Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe, Amnesty International,
Caritas, etc.) have brought with them the moral and symbolic capital associated
with church-based or human rights organisations to support their arguments
that the EU needs to consider migrant and minority concerns as part of its
developing agenda.
When referring to the co-option of these groups, I don’t mean that they are
entirely creatures of the EU institutions. Rather, I refer to the ways in which supranational
institutions, the European Commission in particular, will support (in some
cases even establish) groups with which they can consult. This fulfils a Commission
need to discuss with representatives of civil society and thus add some legitimisation
to what can be rather detached policy development. There’s another point here
too. The close links between the Commission and lobby groups can lead to the
formation of pro-European integration alliances where the identification of
‘problems of Europe’ can prompt the solution of ‘more Europe’ to counter these
supposed weaknesses. In these terms, ideas such as ‘social inclusion’ have been useful