Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization
Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization
Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization
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94 Andrew Geddes<br />
Parliament 1998; Chopin <strong>and</strong> Niessen 2001). The change of government in<br />
the UK in 1997 also removed the opposition to the inclusion of specific antidiscrimination<br />
provisions held by the Conservative government. Ideas about<br />
anti-discrimination had been actively circulating at EU level throughout the<br />
1990s. The new Article 13 reflected these ideas <strong>and</strong> brought together a number<br />
of equality concerns (race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, gender <strong>and</strong> sexual<br />
orientation) under one Treaty heading. The key factor was, however, the<br />
intergovernmental impetus given by the widely held view that ‘something needed<br />
to be done’ about racism <strong>and</strong> xenophobia <strong>and</strong> the unblocking of the process after<br />
the change of government in the UK. This does leave another issue: the rapid<br />
progress from proposal to legislation (December 1999–June 2000) of the antidiscrimination<br />
directives.<br />
In seven months between December 1999 <strong>and</strong> June 2000 the Commission<br />
proposals on anti-discrimination legislation were turned into two directives on race<br />
equality, equal treatment in the workplace <strong>and</strong> an accompanying action programme<br />
to support implementation of the legislation. This ‘world record’ progress is<br />
particularly interesting because these areas were new policy issues for the EU (Tyson<br />
2001). Ideas had been circulating, but there had not previously been a Treaty<br />
basis for legislative action. Indeed, the Commission itself had been sceptical about<br />
progress. It hoped that its package of measures – the two directives <strong>and</strong> action<br />
programme – would be adopted by the end of the French Presidency in December<br />
2000. The Portuguese government which held the Council Presidency were keen<br />
to secure some prestige associated with adoption of at least one directive, but found<br />
it difficult to judge the issue on which progress towards legislation was most likely.<br />
February 2000 was the key month. By this time, the Council working group<br />
composed of national officials had only had time for a first reading of the proposals.<br />
Parallel to this were developments linked to the entry into the Austrian coalition of<br />
Haider’s Freedom Party (FPÖ). On 31 January 2000 14 member states announced<br />
that they would suspend bilateral official contacts at political level with an Austrian<br />
Government integrating the FPÖ, but on 3 February, a coalition government<br />
was formed in Austria with the FPÖ. A week later (11–12 February), an informal<br />
meeting of the Ministers for Employment <strong>and</strong> Social Affairs in Lisbon had been<br />
scheduled. The French minister Martine Aubry <strong>and</strong> her Belgian colleague were<br />
the most vocal in calling for action against the new Austrian government. This had<br />
a symbolic dimension when the French <strong>and</strong> Belgian ministers refused to participate<br />
in the usual end of meeting group photo.<br />
What effect did this have on the negotiations? The British, Dutch <strong>and</strong> Swedish<br />
governments were happy with the content of the directives because they accorded<br />
fairly closely with measures already adopted in national law. They had one<br />
or two particular concerns, but the adoption of the directives would be fairly<br />
costless because there was a good fit with national legislation <strong>and</strong> thus little<br />
adaptive pressure. The Portuguese presidency was keen to push for a resolution.<br />
The issues were potentially trickier for the French because their policy approach<br />
had consciously eschewed British- <strong>and</strong> Dutch-style ethnic minorities policy <strong>and</strong><br />
preferred the assimilationist approach central to ‘national integration’. But, as