24.04.2014 Views

Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

94 Andrew Geddes<br />

Parliament 1998; Chopin <strong>and</strong> Niessen 2001). The change of government in<br />

the UK in 1997 also removed the opposition to the inclusion of specific antidiscrimination<br />

provisions held by the Conservative government. Ideas about<br />

anti-discrimination had been actively circulating at EU level throughout the<br />

1990s. The new Article 13 reflected these ideas <strong>and</strong> brought together a number<br />

of equality concerns (race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, gender <strong>and</strong> sexual<br />

orientation) under one Treaty heading. The key factor was, however, the<br />

intergovernmental impetus given by the widely held view that ‘something needed<br />

to be done’ about racism <strong>and</strong> xenophobia <strong>and</strong> the unblocking of the process after<br />

the change of government in the UK. This does leave another issue: the rapid<br />

progress from proposal to legislation (December 1999–June 2000) of the antidiscrimination<br />

directives.<br />

In seven months between December 1999 <strong>and</strong> June 2000 the Commission<br />

proposals on anti-discrimination legislation were turned into two directives on race<br />

equality, equal treatment in the workplace <strong>and</strong> an accompanying action programme<br />

to support implementation of the legislation. This ‘world record’ progress is<br />

particularly interesting because these areas were new policy issues for the EU (Tyson<br />

2001). Ideas had been circulating, but there had not previously been a Treaty<br />

basis for legislative action. Indeed, the Commission itself had been sceptical about<br />

progress. It hoped that its package of measures – the two directives <strong>and</strong> action<br />

programme – would be adopted by the end of the French Presidency in December<br />

2000. The Portuguese government which held the Council Presidency were keen<br />

to secure some prestige associated with adoption of at least one directive, but found<br />

it difficult to judge the issue on which progress towards legislation was most likely.<br />

February 2000 was the key month. By this time, the Council working group<br />

composed of national officials had only had time for a first reading of the proposals.<br />

Parallel to this were developments linked to the entry into the Austrian coalition of<br />

Haider’s Freedom Party (FPÖ). On 31 January 2000 14 member states announced<br />

that they would suspend bilateral official contacts at political level with an Austrian<br />

Government integrating the FPÖ, but on 3 February, a coalition government<br />

was formed in Austria with the FPÖ. A week later (11–12 February), an informal<br />

meeting of the Ministers for Employment <strong>and</strong> Social Affairs in Lisbon had been<br />

scheduled. The French minister Martine Aubry <strong>and</strong> her Belgian colleague were<br />

the most vocal in calling for action against the new Austrian government. This had<br />

a symbolic dimension when the French <strong>and</strong> Belgian ministers refused to participate<br />

in the usual end of meeting group photo.<br />

What effect did this have on the negotiations? The British, Dutch <strong>and</strong> Swedish<br />

governments were happy with the content of the directives because they accorded<br />

fairly closely with measures already adopted in national law. They had one<br />

or two particular concerns, but the adoption of the directives would be fairly<br />

costless because there was a good fit with national legislation <strong>and</strong> thus little<br />

adaptive pressure. The Portuguese presidency was keen to push for a resolution.<br />

The issues were potentially trickier for the French because their policy approach<br />

had consciously eschewed British- <strong>and</strong> Dutch-style ethnic minorities policy <strong>and</strong><br />

preferred the assimilationist approach central to ‘national integration’. But, as

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!