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Russian perspectives 157
4 The perceived Tatar qualities were used to characterise not only the Tatars of
the Volga and of Crimea but Muslim peoples in general who came under the
sway of Russia since the end of the eighteenth century. ‘Tatar’ merged with the
concept of ‘Asian’ in contrast to ‘European’.
5 But the Asian qualities of Russia could also be seen in a positive way. Some
Russian intellectuals did identify themselves as partly ‘Asian’. To be ‘Asian’
meant to be young, vital, not yet decadent if uncouth, cruel but honest. In
opposing the West, this Tatar–Asian image could be used as a threat against
the West. This was the case in ‘Eurasianism’ which was revived in the 1990s
(Isaev 1992: 3–26).
These Russian self-descriptions of the effects of the ‘Tatar yoke’ corresponded to
Western descriptions of Russia. Accordingly, Russia was characterised as ‘Asian’,
non-European, as a political and military threat which had to be fenced off in order
to protect Europe from barbarity. In this perspective Russians were equated with
the wild invaders of past centuries like the Huns or the Mongols. Obviously, Russian
historians and intellectuals were readers of these Western interpretations as well.
The arguments underlying the concept of the ‘Tatar yoke’ were extended to the
Muslims of Central Asia, homeland of legendary cruel Asian despots like Genghis
Khan or Timurlane. It was extended to the wild tribes of the Caucasus mountains
as well, who had stubbornly opposed Russian rule in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, especially the Chechens as the incarnation of the wild, unruly and
predatory ‘gorec’. In this context the Chechens had played a dominant role in Russian
fiction and poetry of the nineteenth century. The anti-Chechen stereotypes of today,
brutal kidnappers who like to maim their victims, mafiosi of the mountains and the
big Russian cities, reflect an attitude which had already been largely accepted in the
nineteenth century (Dunlop 1998; Gammer 1994; Seely 2001). In Russian and later
in Soviet historiography they could be contrasted with more civilised peoples of the
Caucasus region like the Georgians, who allegedly submitted voluntarily to Russian
rule and hereby had proved their high culture.
Even in this case, it is possible to notice the underlying ambivalence in characterising
the wild and unruly inhabitants of the Caucasus mountains, the ‘gorcy’. In
Russian literature, even the Chechens could be depicted as noble savages whose
manners were characterised by hospitality, magnanimity and friendliness, even if
everybody had to be aware of their vengefulness.
In their confrontation with ‘Asia’ the Russian self-image could be European in
the emphatic sense of the word. According to this perspective Russia had a civilising
mission for the Eastern, Muslim and Asian peoples. It was an outpost of Western,
European civilization. This self-definition has constantly been enacted in Russian
and Soviet policies in the face of Central Asia and the Caucasus. It was and still is,
in this sense, a core element of Russian identity-construction.
This perspective and its reflections in actual political attitudes has often been
underestimated in the West. The astonishing phenomenon that the ongoing war in
Chechnya has won the support of a majority of the Russian population and that even
many Russian intellectuals do not understand Western objections to human rights