Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

154 Erhard Stölting
thought since the emergence of Slavophilism in the nineteenth century (Walicki
1989: 421–58). It has been and still is very much alive even if the deep political and
societal crisis has led to widespread emotional and moral insecurity or political
apathy. But the post-Soviet moral and political crisis can be seen as defined by
traditional Russian thinking because even unhappiness is shaped by traditional
preconceptions. Thus, the traditional Russian idea determines the perception of
the present crisis. The lack of binding moral values demands a solution for perceived
shortcomings. The new binding ideology will resemble the old one.
Yet, still another phenomenon can be detected in the competition for a new
moral system and a common world view. The present crisis is defined at least in part
as a result of the crumbling Soviet system which had been held together by Marxist-
Leninist ideology. The value system and the common world view is, thus, seen in
analogy to this ideology. The underlying political approach is functionalist insofar
as the criterion for the acceptability of the intended new ideology is not some
inherent truth but its ability to enforce order and to stabilise and invigorate society.
However, the functionalist approach contains a dilemma which elsewhere has
been described as the ‘dilemma of conservatism’ (Greiffenhagen 1971). An altruistic
value system can only be effective if people believe in its unconditional truth
and legitimacy. But no functionalist argument can prove the unconditional truth of
any value. On the contrary, arguing rationally for the usefulness and hence the
acceptability of values destroys their pretence to unconditional authority. The
inherent authoritarianism of classical functionalist thinking thus becomes apparent.
The ruling elite may rationally discuss the usefulness of one value or another. But
it has to shield this discussion from the wider public, because the bulk of society
has to believe and to obey.
The very call for a new binding ideology can be seen as being part of an
authoritarian political tradition. In this way, the intended competition has proven
its uselessness. The new ‘Russian idea’ was conceived in the spirit of the old one
(Berdiaev 1979; McDaniel 1998: 162–73).
This ‘Russian idea’ was to be more than functional in the moral cohesion of
Russian society. It had to be the essence of a historically specific collective
individuality.
Collective identities and Russian identity
Collective identities are supposed to encompass the characteristics of certain societal
entities defined as a nation, a profession, a religion, etc. As a rule, it is supposed that
these identities form a coherent whole; but in most cases this presupposition can be
falsified on close scrutiny. Hidden under the strong conviction of the collective as
an integrated whole, different images and beliefs can be found which sometimes
are even contradictory and often have rather heterogeneous roots. Therefore not
all aspects of a constructed collected identity will be used at the same time. Different
images are stored up in a kind of arsenal and kept ready for future use under diverse
conditions and with diverse aims. Some may be chosen in appropriate circumstances
while others are rejected if they do not fit this specific situation; they have to wait