Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization
Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization
Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization
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162 Erhard Stölting<br />
In general, this kind of Russophilia indicated an anti-Western attitude in the<br />
German context. It either symbolised the wish to dissociate from a Germany which<br />
had become too modern <strong>and</strong> too westernised, or it symbolised the idea of the<br />
basically Eastern character of Germany as opposed to the West; Russia <strong>and</strong><br />
Germany were seen as twin nations.<br />
The situation in Russia was quite different. As romantic anti-Westernism was<br />
claimed as something essentially Russian, it could not be German. So even the early<br />
impression made by Schelling or Hegel was subsequently kept secret or denied.<br />
It was said that nobody in the West, including German Romantics, was able to<br />
penetrate or underst<strong>and</strong> the deep Russian mind. The dominant image of Germany<br />
remained that of a Western nation. The Russian mind was unfathomable.<br />
The situation was different with Russian Westernisers. As can be exemplified<br />
with Herzen, they no longer tended to identify with Germany, but with France or<br />
Britain. According to an older image, Germany was the cold <strong>and</strong> philistine nation<br />
in contrast to magnanimous <strong>and</strong> sparkling France or solidly cosmopolitan Britain,<br />
the identification with the West going as far as contempt for Germans, <strong>and</strong> especially<br />
its émigré community (Gertsen 1973: 130–54, 397–400).<br />
The Soviet Union <strong>and</strong> the Great Patriotic War<br />
In many respects Soviet self-definitions preserved the great Russian idea in Marxist-<br />
Leninist disguise. In the public rituals, in the veneration of strong leaders, in the<br />
enforcement of unconditional submission <strong>and</strong> in the authoritarian power structures,<br />
the Byzantine tradition was alive although it was veiled by Marxist-Leninist <strong>and</strong><br />
internationalist rhetoric in the Soviet Union.<br />
But ever since Stalin rose to absolute power at the end of the 1920s, official<br />
Communist ideology cannot be seen as a continuation of Westernising aspects<br />
of the Russian tradition alone. With the Third International, Moscow became<br />
the focal point of world history. If for Trotsky <strong>and</strong> many of the elder Bolsheviks the<br />
Revolution had to take place on a global scale or at least in the developed world,<br />
the end of the ‘Permanent Revolution’ marked a shift from ubiquity to a<br />
geographical centre. Moscow became the focal point of world history once more as<br />
it had in the ideology of the Russian empire.<br />
Until the Second World War, Germany was held in high esteem. It was<br />
the country of birth of Marx, Engels <strong>and</strong> also of minor socialist theorists like Rosa<br />
Luxemburg <strong>and</strong> Karl Kautsky. It was the country which until the outbreak of the<br />
First World War had had a particularly strong <strong>and</strong> disciplined socialist movement.<br />
It was even expected for some time that Germany should be the second country in<br />
which a socialist revolution would be successful. But support for the German<br />
government by the majority of the Social Democrats at the outbreak of the war<br />
<strong>and</strong> the role they played in the crushing the Spartakus rebellion of November<br />
1918 in Berlin could be integrated into a gr<strong>and</strong> historical tale: the leadership of the<br />
global socialist movement had passed from Germany to Russia. Moscow had<br />
become the Third Rome of socialism. Indeed, since 1929 Stalin himself had become<br />
the living incarnation of socialism <strong>and</strong> was ascribed a charismatic position which<br />
no Czar had ever reached in previous times (Stölting 1997: 45–74).