Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

Migration and cultural diversification 113
On the other hand, immigrants especially those from a rural background, may
cling to their traditionalism, tend to form an ethnic enclave in the receiving society,
and alienate themselves from both the host and the home country. 14 A good example
is provided by the Turkish neighbourhood in Vienna where a traditional community
has been established in one building: ‘At the entrance level . . . there was an allmen’s
coffee house, and below the ground level was the mosque. The life in this
building was like a “squeezed village life”’ (Erman and Turan 1997: 8–9). 15 More
importantly, the community persuaded its female members to start covering their
bodies and hair, a practice which had been abandoned back in the home village!
This instance relates to a broader issue of the deliberate rejection expressed
by some ethnic communities of the liberal principles: the rule of secular law, the
separation of church and state, universal education, the emancipation of women,
freedom of speech, etc., that underpin modern democracies. For instance, some
Muslim immigrants insist upon organising their life according to their laws that
endorse the seclusion of women, daily prayer, etc., and collide with the secular,
liberal principles governing the social and political life of Western democracies.
Indeed, the reaction of immigrants who are followers of orthodox Islam reveals the
limits to the rhetoric on incorporation of migrants, at least some of them.
Furthermore, the reception of Islam in Western democracies is double-edged. On
the one hand, several Western European states are working to allow some space for
Islam within national symbols and national institutions (Modood 1997). In some of
them Islam is also given high status, for instance in Belgium, Islam was recognised
as one of the official state religions as early as 1974. Nevertheless, this religion
happens to be perceived as the main threat to what is conceived of as Western
civilization, and Muslims happen to be portrayed as ‘invaders’ or alien ‘others’ also
by ‘the commentators in the quality media and many social scientists’ (Rex 1996). 16
This indicates that, despite incorporation efforts, Islam remains an alien set of
ideas within Western receiving societies. However, ‘At least in Britain, committed
Christians are less likely to express prejudice against Muslims than are nominal
Christians and agnostics/atheists’ (ibid.). Thus the alienation does not stem from
rejection by other believers, i.e. Christians, it is rather a reaction to the orthodox
Muslims’ will and attempt to organise the whole, not only private, life according to
Islam’s prescriptions that clashes with the liberal principles of the secular state.
On the other hand, the committed advocates of these principles tend to perceive
them as a ‘secular religion’ while remaining intolerant of any religion in the public
sphere. Actually, the inflows of alien cultures have taken place ‘at a time when
industrial countries have lost confidence in the values of their own societies, the
worth of their own nation or the truths of their own religion’ (Coleman 1994: 43).
Another aspect of this profound cultural change has been a development of a civil
society founded upon liberal principles, and this transformation has not eased the
concurrent integration of the bearers of distant cultures. The liberal principles of
the ‘open society’ agreed upon as the modern creed of secularised democracies
that are to be accepted by the newcomers collide with traditional values safeguarded
by a number of migrant communities. The latter praise their non-Christian religion
and traditional principles of conduct, and openly oppose the liberal, secularised, and