Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

158 Erhard Stölting
violations in this case, can be explained by the assumption that Russia is protecting
Europe and European civilization against the menace of barbaric disorder. The
Russian view on Chechnya resembles the Western view on Russia.
It is for this reason that Western criticism of warfare in Chechnya has always
been perceived as an offence: the West was seen as rebuffing Russia at a moment
when it was defending Western civilization. Similar responses to Western ignorance
can be found throughout the political and cultural history of Russia.
The ‘Tatar’ and ‘Asian’ types of argument occupy important parts of the
conceptual arsenal of Russian identity constructions. They can be combined with
an imperial perspective in the strict sense. The awareness that by any standards
Russia and the Soviet Union were and are very large and the corresponding pride
have been central to Russian self-esteem at least since the nineteenth century. Even
today this pride is reflected in the aspiration that Russia, in principle, is a superpower
which has the right to be treated on an equal level with the United States. To deny
this status is felt as an offence. If Russia is not in a position to realise its position as
a superpower the reason must be either Western perfidy or treason in Russia, for
which politicians like Gorbachev or Yeltsin have been responsible.
Apparently, the topic of the overwhelming size of a country and the pride it can
inspire is neither inherently Western or Eastern. But it can be combined with other
images and, like these, be differently valued. The problems Russia is confronted with
can be seen to be as large as the country itself. But alternatively, Russia can be seen
as possessing a natural right to centrality and dominance. Historical distress results
wherever actual capabilities do not match justified claims.
The idea of a strong and centralised Russian state can be identified with the idea
of a strong ruler. It corresponds to the Byzantine imperial concept which has been
the official ideology since Ivan III (1440–1505). According to this doctrine, the
Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 made Moscow the centre of the
Christian universe, the ‘Third Rome’. The prince of Moscow was now legally the
emperor (Czar). The Byzantine double eagle became the Russian state emblem,
Byzantine court ceremonials were adapted in the Kremlin of Moscow certifying
that it had become the legitimate centre of the universe (Rimscha 1983: 152ff).
This official ideology put an end to previous self-conceptions which defined the
Russian princes as being culturally and religiously dependent on the Byzantine
empire. Moscow assumed the political and religious claim for universal leadership.
This claim defined the heathens of the East as people to be brought under the firm,
benevolent, and civilising rule of the Czar. At the same time it prefigured the contrast
to the Latin West: as the Western Christian churches did not recognize true –
orthodox – Christianity it was by definition heretic. The West was evil and
treacherous because it rejected true faith.
Russia and Germany
Seen from Russia, Germany lies in the West. But the mutual perceptions between
Russia and Germany were more complicated and specific; they had been intense
for long and created several ambivalent conceptual types.