Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

140 Willfried Spohn
The consequence of these stereotypical fears on both sides is that the accession
of Poland to the European Union – in all probability in 2004 – will be accompanied,
at the request of the German and Polish governments, by a transition period of
about four to seven years in which Poles will have only limited access to the Western
European labour market and foreigners will be restricted in buying Polish land.
Yet, these delaying measures will apply only temporarily and the full accession of
Poland will prove that the stereotypical fears on the German and the Polish sides
are grossly exaggerated. It is not the case that Poles, who will find growing
opportunities in their own country, will be motivated to emigrate in growing
numbers to Germany, nor are the Germans, who are only to a very small degree
still farmers, particularly interested in Polish land. On the contrary, the Eastern
enlargement will accelerate the economic exchange and interconnection between
both countries, continuing – but with a diminishing power hierarchy – a West–East
German–Polish gradient. In addition, the membership by the East Central
European countries of the European Union will even more than now counterbalance
the political weight of the large Western European states by the many
small states. With it also, the still existing power hierarchy between Germany and
Poland will be further reduced. Finally, the accession of Poland to the European
Union will also offer more opportunities for an increased cultural exchange between
the two countries. Even if these opportunities are taken up, this will probably not
mean a complete reversal of the cultural hierarchy between the two countries: the
high level of interest by Poles in German and Western cultures and languages and
the low interest of Germans in Polish culture and language. But an increasing
cultural exchange would be the only way to further reduce the still present and often
unconscious national missionary overtones and stereotypical fears in both nations
by a common participation in a multiple European culture.
Notes
1 For a political study see Bingen 1997; for a critical analysis, Krzeminski 2001.
2 For political-sociological studies see Hanson and Spohn 1995; Katzenstein 1977, 1998;
and Markovits and Reich 1997.
3 For an overview see Spohn 2000a.
4 European historical-comparative approaches are Schieder 1992; Schulze 1994; and
Smith 1986.
5 Amongst others see particularly Conze 1992; Dann 1993.
6 See with extensive literature Spohn 1995.
7 This is my central thesis in Spohn forthcoming.
8 For a study on the Eastern German border regions, see Baranowski 1995.
9 The following figures are based on Benz 1992: 413–19; Dimitrow 1992: 420–7.
10 On post-Second World War German–Polish relations see Rosenthal 1976.
11 As a recent interpretation of German history after 1945 see Winkler 2001.
12 Among others see particularly Berghahn 1987; Conze and Lepsius 1984; Dahrendorf
1965.
13 See, among others Childs 1988; Glaeßner 1989; Kaelble and Kocka 1994.
14 See particularly Davies 1981: 556–663; Hoensch 1990; Krzeminski 1991.
15 Bingen 1999: 175–6. The Polish GDP/FDI ratio is however considerably lower than
the Hungarian one; see Greskovits and Bohle 2001: 3–27.