Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

138 Willfried Spohn
with nationalistic missions have lost their force. As a corollary, the revived traditional
stereotypes have also remained limited in scope and in addition are counteracted
by the political and cultural elites in both countries and their positive relationship
to each other. Let us finally ask: how does this inter-societal matrix between
Germany and Poland affect the extension of European integration to the East and
how will the extending Eastern enlargement of the European Union impact on
the further development of this German–Polish relational matrix?
The evolving Eastern enlargement of the European Union is motivated by a
variety of imperatives shared by the Western European and Eastern European elites
(Spohn 2000). It is supposed to accelerate the reconnection between the two parts
of the continent; support an overarching pan-European peace and security zone;
create a pan-European economy in order to level down the traditional socioeconomic
gap; extend the transnational political and legal institutional order of
the European Union in order to stabilise the consolidation of the new democracies
in Central and Eastern Europe; and improve the cultural understanding between
the multiple ethnic and national cultures and identities in Europe. For the actual
development and shape of the Eastern enlargement process not only do these
guiding imperatives, but also complex structural conditions come into play:
the political and economic interests of each country; the reform capacity of the
European Union to take in tendentially double as many member states; and
the adaptation capacity of the Central and Eastern European accession candidates
to comply with the entrance criteria to the European Union. In this overall context
of the Eastern enlargement, the German–Polish relations have played a crucial role.
Germany as the country directly neighbouring to Central and Eastern Europe
has a vital geopolitical and economic interest to integrate these countries in the
common European institutional framework. Poland as the biggest East-Central
country represents a sort of litmus test of whether or not the Eastern enlargement
of the European Union will work.
These converging geopolitical interests also determine the attitudes of the elites
to the Eastern enlargement on both sides. A recent survey analysis of German and
Polish elite attitudes to the Eastern enlargement of the European Union reveals a
considerable degree of convergence, with some characteristic differences (Eberwein
and Ecker-Erhardt 2001). On the part of the German elite, 85 per cent support
the accession of Poland to the European Union, 11.5 per cent are undecided and
only 3.5 per cent are against. On the part of the Polish elite, even 95.2 per cent are
in favour of Poland’s integration into the European Union and only 1.6 per cent
are against, with 3.2 per cent undecided (Eberwein and Ecker-Erhardt 2001: 52).
Regarding the potential gains and losses for Poland resulting from the Eastern
enlargement, the German and the Polish sides share the expectation that Poland
will be recognised fully as part of Europe and will be protected from Russia. But the
Polish side sets more hope in influencing European culture and improving Polish
living standards; whereas the German side emphasises more the considerable
support for Poland from EU funds. Regarding the gains and losses for Germany,
both sides agree that Germany will win new Eastern European markets, but the
Polish side emphasises more that Germany will win more security at its Eastern