Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

90 Andrew Geddes
terms, the Europeanisation of debates about migrant inclusion confounds both a
narrow state-centrism and post-national universalism.
This still leaves the question of how we are to explain the resources available to
pro-migrant groups. In his analysis of the politics of migration in liberal states,
Freeman (1995) argued that there were tendencies towards both expansive and
inclusive policies because of the ways in which the concentrated beneficiaries of
policy have a clearer incentive to organise compared to the diffuse bearers of costs.
He argued that business interests would be likely to push for expansive migration
policies while pro-migrant groups would be advocates of more inclusive policies
that extend rights to migrants. This work has been developed by those who argue
that the venues in which decisions about migration are taken are particularly
important. Guiraudon, for instance, has argued that relatively shielded judicial
and bureaucratic venues offer more scope for the protection of migrants’ rights
because these are less exposed to broader public debates.
What does this mean for pro-migrant groups at EU level? If we think about
the resources that pro-migrant groups at EU level are likely to possess then it’s fair
to say that they tend to be relatively weak. Public opinion across the EU tends to
be anti-immigration and anti-immigrant while non-national migrants have
limited access to local and national political systems, never mind to the EU political
system (EUMC 2000). Yet, this need not stultify the scope for pro-migrant advocacy.
Venue-switching, Guiraudon (2000) argues, is an important device because it can
lead to decisions being made in relatively shielded bureaucratic or judicial venues.
As a result, some political opportunities can arise where decision-makers are
relatively shielded from anti-immigration/immigrant pressures, such as behind the
relatively closed doors of the European Commission and the European Court
of Justice (ECJ). The European Commission’s technocratic origins mean that it
tends to search for technical solutions to political problems. It can also be responsive
to the ideas that pro-migrant NGOs bring forward. In this sense, the EU’s
‘democratic deficit’ arising from the lack of direct political participation, may offer
new political opportunities. Problems can arise if decisions made behind closed
doors are subject to wider public scrutiny later down the line.
It is in these terms that pro-migrant mobilisation at EU level has been identified
that seeks to capitalise on shielded EU venues and EU sources of legal and symbolic
power (Geddes, 2000b). It’s also worth bearing in mind that EU laws can feed back
into domestic contexts and challenge national ways of doing things. Keck and
Sikkink (1998), for instance, argue that transnational advocacy can create a ‘boomerang
effect’ where resource-poor national organisations can be strengthened
by resource-rich international organisations.
At this stage, we need to become a bit more specific. We have identified the
kinds of spaces created for pro-migrant mobilisation and the kinds of action favoured
in a European context. But what are the components of this EU-level migrantinclusion
agenda? Their main elements can be identified: extended antidiscrimination
provisions, the extension of the rights of EU citizenship to legally
resident third country nationals (TCNs); and asylum procedures judged fair and
humane to the extent that they accord with international standards.