Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

A European heritage?
The collective identity of Europe 33
At the end of these remarks we may raise the question why this secular shift from
triumphant to traumatic memories occurred in Europe, what conditions fostered
it, and in particular why this memory of a collective trauma should be considered
as a European peculiarity? Indeed the trauma of genocide and the collective
responsibility of the perpetrators are by no means a unique European feature. But
the official response of Turkey to the Armenian genocide or the Japanese reaction
to the international pressure to apologise for the Nanjing massacres differ in great
respect from the European response to the Shoah. The Turkish and Japanese
reluctance even to admit the crimes can hardly be explained by a phase of latency
in which a nation is ridden with haunting individual memories and cannot stand
to face the brutal conversion of her triumphant heroes into criminal perpetrators.
In Europe as well as in Japan or in Turkey the perpetrators are dead and out of the
reach of jurisdiction. Also the rise of international media networks that increases
the sensitivity with respect to triumphant manifestations of national identity between
neighbour states extends to Japan as well as to Europe.
But neither is it simple chauvinism that prevents these nations from admitting
their genocidal crimes. Instead their reluctance or refusal hints at different religious
foundations of collective identity. In the Judeo-Christian tradition the confession
of guilt not only relieves the confessor from the burden of guilt but it even uplifts
him to a purified position. If in addition to this, the confessing individual even proves
to be innocent, but nevertheless takes the burden of collective guilt, he sanctifies
his own mundane individuality, he performs Christomimesis. Christ represents
the ultimate innocent individual, the son of God who sacrificed his life in order to
relieve the burden of collective guilt from his people. 5 Thus the European ritual of
confessing the guilt of the past relies on a mythology that continues even if the
political representatives performing this ritual are utterly secularised individuals
who ignore the cultural origin of their actions.
In contrast, Japanese confessions of guilt are limited to individuals, who are
blamed for having put shame on the collectivity, the nation, the family (Benedict
1974). Here, the relation between individual and collective identity is reversed: it is
only the individual who can be guilty, humiliated and ashamed, whereas the
embracing collectivity cannot be imagined other than as innocent. The reason for
this remarkable difference can be found in the axial contrast between the worldly
deed and otherworldly salvation in the European case, whereas in the Japanese
perspective the confession of guilt cannot be alleviated by the promise of salvation
(Eisenstadt 1996; Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995). Furthermore, the European heritage
of moral universalism also transfers its moral perspective to the level of international
relations, while from a Japanese or Chinese point of view these are totally different
spheres.
Even with respect to the spread of rituals of mourning and confessions of collective
guilt, European identity relies on a cultural heritage that continues – in many
transformations – even if the Europeans are no longer aware of it. Of course, the
Christian myth of the redeeming sacrifice of the innocent is not the only possible