Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

112 Krystyna Romaniszyn
votes’ has been rebutted by the nation-state defenders, arguing that ‘only citizens
should enjoy full political rights . . . [as] voting rights usually assume literacy and
some knowledge of and sympathy for the country and its institutions’ (Coleman
1994: 60). In one view, the voting-rights issue represents a challenge to the future
of Western legal civilization, 11 according to another, ‘citizenship ...is the modern
equivalent of feudal privilege, an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s
life chances’ (Carens 1987: 252). Undoubtedly, the idea of mass participation in the
public domain amounts to wishful thinking when immigrants are deprived of
the voting rights or citizenship.
Second, the newcomers – the potential partners in constructing a shared political
culture – are often economically, politically and educationally disadvantaged over
generations. The analyses show that on the whole, in European recipient states,
unemployment among immigrants and their offspring has been getting worse in the
1990s, and is often higher than in the host population. The second generation’s
school underachievement adds to the problem, decreasing job opportunities
for ethnic youth. A concentration of immigrant settlement in poor districts, along
with a right to preserve their traditional society and culture, may actually lead to
the creation of inner city ghettos, already familiar from the American metropolises.
Paradoxically, the state support received by immigrants may also hinder their
integration. For instance, setting up ethnic schools may lessen a good command
of the official language and general knowledge of the dominant culture, the two
necessary preconditions for upward social mobility. It follows that full exercise of
the proffered rights may strengthen structural discrimination (see below) leading
to social and economic marginalisation of immigrants, at least in the short term. The
implementation of multicultural curricula, aimed at acquainting students with the
diversity and wealth of the cultures represented in the society, and at inculcating
them with respect for the ‘other’ also faces various obstacles. For instance, some
Muslim minorities demand separate education for girls or even separate Muslim
schools, while some white parents remove their children from schools where ethnic
minority pupils predominate, and where a multicultural curriculum has been
enforced (Coleman 1994: 58, 62).
This brings us to the issue of immigrant responses to state policy. Generally, and
obviously, they either withdraw from, or try to enhance their participation in a
wider society. The latter attitude most likely evokes the expectation of ‘mutual
respect’, and replaces a demand for ‘rights’ or ‘equality’ (Modood 1997: 6). 12 Such
an attitude indicates an effort on the part of the immigrants involved to shift from
a client-status to a partner one, suggesting that at least the socially active cohort of
immigrants has ceased to perceive themselves as clients of the recipient state
(Romaniszyn 2002). 13 An attempt to overcome a patron–client relationship between
the host state and immigrants should be regarded as a crucial qualitative change
which paves the way to a conscious citizenship of the newcomers, providing the
immigrants cease to be perceived by the host state as the passive clients. This seems
to be one necessary precondition for both the participation in construction, and
utilisation of ‘the common sphere’ by immigrants, and hence for achieving any of
the ideal types of response to ethnic diversity presented by Modood.