Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration ... - europeanization

Illusions of European integration 49
authority to the only credible repositories of democratic practice, the nation-states.
Different versions of such an arrangement, enshrining the ideal of ‘ever closer union
of peoples’, have been mooted: including a federal state sustained by a Constitutional
Court on USA or German models. But constitutions have to have within them
the potential for adaptation so that they can address circumstances unimaginable
to their formulators. The experience of the USA, Canada and Australia suggests
that a written constitution becomes a battleground between ideological groups
seeking to expand or limit the central state and alter its rulings on fundamental
rights, and that the supposedly neutral Constitutional Courts become politicised in
the process. In the USA such conflicts over states’ rights tied to the issue of slavery
led to civil war.
A major difficulty of codifying decisively the respective spheres of the EU and
nation-states is that nations change in what they perceive to be their core regulatory
concerns, as they encounter the challenges of an ever-changing world. If that is
so even within a single state, a constitution formulated for a union of many nationstates
will almost certainly be the site of perpetual political conflict.
Conclusion
The movement for European integration is justified by several rhetorics – the
extension of democracy and human rights, enhancing economic progress, becoming
a world actor, taking responsibility for European security. All of these have their
point, but this is above all an elite-driven, even an Imperial (Franco-German)
project, infused with a strong subterranean desire to contain the resurgence of
historical national differences at the very centre, as well as on the eastern fringes,
of Europe. The drive to integrate, however, exacerbates the problem. Centralising
powers in European institutions raises expectations of what the EU can deliver
while multiplying the problems it must resolve, and it intensifies the gap between
elites and peoples by transferring powers from national parliaments to arcane and
all but unaccountable institutions. A resentment of an invasive Imperial centre is
the classic breeding ground of European nationalism, especially when the Imperial
elites are divided by their national visions of Europe.
Myths and symbols provide key components of understanding and directing
change. Even in normal times, as Michael Billig (1995) has demonstrated, the
discourse of politicians is laden with national myths, images and a national rhetoric,
often derived from warfare, which insiders take for granted. The legend of the nation
is of a community knit by love and common sacrifice. Its myths and symbols orient
its members to fundamental values – to homeland, the defence of ‘irreplaceable
cultural values’, and to the freedom of its people. Images establish a common bond
between leaders and led and legitimise even in ‘normal times’ difficult decisions
– the imposition of heavier taxes in economic difficulties, the redistribution of
resources between richer and poorer regions or classes. At times of extraordinary
crises – the outbreak of war or economic depression – mythic images of kinship can
inspire great sacrifice on behalf of the nation-state. One of the characteristics of
such myth–symbol complexes is that they remain empty or alien to the outsider.