Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

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A CONT/:,rITlOUS CEASE-FIRED
to the Pathet Lao later, arbitrary restrictions on the supply of weapons and
ammunition would be even more destructive of Hmong security."D
From Honolulu, Admiral Felt weighed in with a passionate endorsement of
Ambassador Brown's reservations about reasonable expectations of a ceasefire.
More basically, he wanted to "urge that every possible influence be
exerted to keep Laos from being negotiated away to the communists." Our
local allies, not just the Lao and Prime Minister Sarit but also President Ngo
Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, already doubted our resolve, and Washington
had. to ensure that the communists understood that the United States would
fight to preserve Laotian neutrality. This meant, in practical terms, that "some
agreement has got to be reached in Washington on the point beyond which we
.will not be pushed.""D
Such an agreement was not to be achieved, as the administration implicitly
rejected the calls to action emanating from the defense establishment. Instead,
the State Department continued searching for a formula that would ensure the
survival of the RLG and the Hmong without requiring the commitment of
American troops. At Geneva, where talks began on 16 May, the United States
argued for cease-fire terms that would secure the Mekong River valley and
Hmong-controlled portions of Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua. At the same
time, Washington continued trying to square the circle in its dealings with the
Hmong, hoping to minimize its still-undeclared support while preserving their
ability to defend themselves against communist incursions.'0
At this point, in late May 1961, the Hmong had become the principal
instrument of a continued RLG presence in northeastern Laos. But they were
now also a client whose dependence on continued US support constituted the
single greatest impediment to a settlement at Geneva. Some at State already
regretted the commitment to the Hmong, but the Department accepted that
the United States had both the "moral obligation and practical need" to protect
the Hmong with material support and with diplomatic efforts on their
behalf at Geneva. 45 D
In Vientiane, the focus remained fixed on protecting the irregulars from a
concerted enemy drive. While Washington treated the conclusion of a permanent,
"watertight" agreement as if it presented a real possibilny] land
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Douglas Blaufarb, then with FEDivision';r
llistened to State Department colleagues
deploring theHmong resistance as an Impediment to speedy agreement atGeneva. (Douglas
Blaufarb, interview by the author, Three Churches. WV, 22 July 1999 (hereafter cited as
Blaufarb interview].D
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