Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

I
C05803949
Chapter Three
just an adviser but a working partner sharing the risks and responsibilities of a
growing program.sO
One small miscalculation had affected the choice of weapons. Lair had
assumed that the tiny Hmong soldier would prefer the lightweight carbine,
and he had included a few M-I rifles only for the larger or hardier volunteers.
But the trainees, some of whom had never seen anything more advanced than
a flintlock musket, instantly recognized the rifle's superior range and accuracy.1
Ihad to help Yang Pao mediate some squabbling over distribution
when the first deli~arrived, and Lair increased the proportion of M-Is in
subsequent drops.'LJ
Whether firing a carbine or an M-l, nearly every Hmong volunteer needed
only a few hours at the improvised firing range before the training team
moved on to combat organization and tactics. The Hmong would not be
mounting company or even platoon-size operations, at first, and I
I frained them to operate in three-man fire teams. They immediately
grasped the principle of fire-and-maneuver, in which one man or element fires
from cover while the other advances, in a kind of leapfrog approach toward
the enemy's position.:D
The .communists-it appears that Kong Le's neutralists seldom if ever
moved against the Hmong-wasted little time reacting to the activity at Pa
Dong. A Pathet Lao unit of reported battalion strength moved to within 2
miles of the training.base, and the Hmong irregulars went into action within a
week of the first weapons drop. The guerrillas ambushed the advancing Pathet
Lao, and in the two days of combat that followed killed a reported 17 enemy.
Never to be renowned for their fire discipline, the Hmong exhausted their
ammunition supply during this action, and Lair flashed a requirement: . I
c::=Jor more." D
By 31 January, a Hmong unit had ranged some 18 miles into contested territory,
where it encountered an enemy patrol, killing 12 and returning with eight
captured weapons. Yang Pao and his advisers expected the communists to
return in force, but early successes like these boosted morale and created a
respite for the rapid expansion about to take place."D
In the next few days, Yang Pao [ ~visited outlying villages, where
the Hmong leader explained the American offer of support, and promised
weapons where local leadership looked committed and strong. Kong Le and
I
'~iIlLair.
6Ibid_
,
e
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--.J
SEC.kTIIMR
T~4