Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
Chapter Six
But neither the Americans-nor, apparently, Prime Minister Sarit-saw
neutralist-communist tensions at Khang Khay as presenting an opportunity
for tougher bargaining there. Everyone shared Harriman's concern about
Souvanna, who, if pushed too far, might simply decamp for Paris, a move
that would certainly bring the two sides back into open warfare. General
Phoumi therefore remained the target of American and Thai presssure. On I
May, the US embassy in Bangkok reported that Sarit had finally persuaded
Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum to accept a coalition with rightists, neutralists,
and the Pathet Lao sharing control of the Defense and Interior Ministries on a
"troika" basis.P0
On 6 May, communist forces seized Nam Tha. The 4,500 FAR defenders-whom
General Phoumi had just reinforced, against American advice,
with a parachute battalion-outnumbered their attackers but offered little
resistance. Instead, they fled toward Ban Houei Sai, a Mekong River port on
the border with Thailand. A Special National Intelligence Estimate concluded
that the "events of the past year have almost certainly convinced the
communist side that the risk of US intervention has lessened significantly."
The Soviets had probably acquiesced in the seizure of Nam Tha, but CIA's
Office of National Estimates believed, nevertheless, that Moscow still preferred
a political settlement. 0 24
This did not necessarily mean that Moscow could or would prevent the
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese from exploiting their success at Nam Tha.
The administration hoped that a show of force would persuade the communists
of the risks of further cease-fire violations, and on 12 May the JCS
ordered Admiral Felt to move US Marine infant} and helicopter units and a
US Air Force tactical squadron to Thailand.si
.For the next month, military contingency planning occupied the center of
the Washington stage. The Nam Tha disaster, combined with a continued.
stalemate in Geneva, increased the likelihood that the United States could
achieve its objectives for Indochina only by applying American military force.
But an invasion of Laos itself involved long supply lines and terrain just as
hostile as the enemy itself. The preeminent importance of Vietnam prompted
Washington to consider an alternative. An amphibious invasion of North Vietnam
just north of the DMZ could quarantine the DMZ, and a push on into
Laos could cut the infiltration routes into South Vietnam. 26 D
"Bangkok Embassy Telegram 1691, 1 May 1962. FRUS /96/-1963, 708-110
24 SNJE58-3-62,Implicationsof the Fall of NamTha, 9 May 1962,FRUS /96/-1963, 726--29n
"Telegram from the lCS to CINCPAC(Felt), 12 May 1962,FRUS 1961-1963, 754-55~
26 Memorandum from Michael V. Forrestal of theNSCStaffto President Kennedy, "Contingency
Planning for Laos," 5 June 1962,FRUS 1961-1963, 816-23 and passim.D
SECLT/fMR
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