Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
Chapter Thirteen
The emphasis on North Vietnam did not last, as that priority almost immediately
began to give way to raids on Laotian targets. In December, more than
three-quarters of some 440 sorties-including 16 striking around Phou Pha
Thi itself-hit enemy locations in northeastern Laos.S4D
In mid-December, with the communists already probing the Phou Pha Thi
perimeter, the momentum began to shift. Growing pressure on the Nam Hac
defenses raised the specter of another humiliating rout for the FAR, and the
US Mission began having second thoughts. It now urged on the Lao its view
that Nam Bac "should not be defended at all costs." Charge d'affaires Robert
Hurwitch expressed confidence that the Lao would adopt this view, but three
weeks later, in early January 1968, they were still hanging on."D '
The station was preoccupied, at this point, with helping FAR move in reinforcements.
Apparently now more optimistic about a successful defense than
those who had sponsored the operation, it was trying to persuade the FAR
command to "expand its defensive perimeter through aggressive ground operations."
These, it was hoped, would prevent further attrition and the eventual
loss of Narn Hac. Vang Pao was already trying to help, having launched diversionary
operations both east and west er the besieged garrison.soD
YetMore TroubleD
As the noose around Nam Hac grew tighter, communist forces in the south
assaulted Lao Ngam, the linchpin ofl
!previously successful Se
Done Valley security project, and inflicted almost 100 casualties. On Christmas
Day of 1967, an attack on Muong Phalane, east of Savannakhet, disabled
the US Air Force TACAN navigational radar there; the installation near Saravane
had been forced to evacuate three weeks earlier. It suddenly appeared, as
Bill Sullivan acknowledged in characteristically off-hand fashion, that
Hanoi's toleration of continued government advances might be coming to an
end. NVA intentions were not yet clear, he wrote, but the "indications so far
are that we shall probably be in for a rather lively time."57D
'It turned out to be livelier than anyone, except perhaps Bill Lair, had
expected. Neither ,last-minute reinforcements nor Vang Pao's diversions
5) Castle,One Day Too Long,61 and 98-101. Apparently sketchily briefed about living andworking
conditions, at leastsome of the IS-oddstaffmade prohibited visits to the village at thefoot of
PhouPhaThi, which m~ave contributed to thecommunists' rapid identification of them. (Castle,
90-92, and98-99.)U "
" Ibid.,98-990
" Vientiane Embassy Telegram 3326, 16 December 1967. FRUS 1964-1968. 639-40;c::::=J
I I I
57 Vientiane Embassy Telegram 3326; Castle, One Day Too Long,27.0
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