Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
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TAKING THE WARTO THEENEMyD
In the north, Vang Pao would have to be persuaded that his American
patrons were serious in their opposition to another try at taking and holding
the Plain of Jars. He must develop new bases in MR 2 for a return to guerrilla
operations and help "bury forever" the term "Mco heartland." NVA offensive
operations might on occasion challenge this strategy.
The Savannakhet Model CU)
As the White House pressed for more action in the Panhandle in mid-1970.
the Savannakhet model of the SGU battalion reached maturity. Smaller than
the 550-man organization of the Hrnong, it had just three companies and a
total complement of a little over 300 men. It had evolved under I
I
[whose case officers discovered that the larger unit
exceeded the ability of indigenous officers to control. D 24
Launched in 1966. the Savannakhet SGU program had endured a tortuous
process of negotiations for manpower followed by the construction and manning
of training facilities. And when the first units came on line. they were
often diverted to bolster FAR static defenses in danger of collapse. In addition.
SGU operations had to compete for tactical air support with requirements not
only in the rest of Laos but in Vietnam. Only after November 1968. when
"President Johnson suspended all bombing of North Vietnam. did tactical air
sUIJport become more freely available for the irregulars.I
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Iunti11969. Savannakhet had. therefore,
enjoyed only limited opportunities to conduct operations involving even one
full battalion.'0
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!irregulars had previously participated in just one mu1tibattalion
operation, in June 1968. when a combined force of SGUs and FAR units had
recaptured Muong Phalane, east of Savannakhet. But this operation had
encountered little resistance, and the SGUs had yet to challenge the enemy on
its own turf. Now. almost a year later.1 Iwas still more concerned with
I
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::Bnterview. The larger formation had heen intended in "the first place as an administrative
unit, with t" compinents deployed separately in combat operationsc=J .
15 Jim Glerum; interview.D .
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