Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

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Chapter Four
ratio rising to more than three to one when local militias and the Hmong
irregulars were included. But the Pathet Lao now benefited from the presence
of perhaps as many as 1,500 North Vietnamese advisers and specialists,
and its combat effectiveness had grown in proportion. With the enemy active
on several fronts, Vientiane had no reserves, and the prospect was one of further
reverses. ISD
The unfavorable military balance left Congress and the State Department
hunting for a formula that would preserve a noncommunist Laos while leaving
the ground combat to indigenous forces. A State telegram of 27 April
defined the problem as one of finding a way to stop the communist military
advance without destroying the possibility of a cease-fire and a negotiated
settlement. The Department doubted that the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese
sought to conquer all of Laos, but it emphatically disclaimed any certain
knowledge of their intentions. Accordingly, it recommended calling a
UN Security Council meeting to mediate between the Laotian factions while
SEATO troops-no Americans, presumably, among them-moved into Vientiane
and southern Laos.I'D
In another telegram, on 28 April, State continued to wrestle with the issue of
ends and means. Part of the dilemma arose from uncertainty about the intentions
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and Washington's call for more intelligence
implied that, whatever the United States might choose to do, it would risk general
war over Laos only with great reluctance. Behind this, finally, lay the question
of the importance to the United States of a noncommunist Laos. State saw
it as contingent in part on the attitudes of Asian governments. "Our national
interest is heavy but [only] part of [the] collective interest in security in Southeast
Asia." If SEATO allies hesitated to participate in collective action, the
United States would have to rethink its responsibilities in the area. For Asian
neutrals as well, the time had come to decide whether the umbrella of US
power required at least their political support in the conflict over Laos. 2 oD
The defense establishment took a harder line. Secretary of Defense
McNamara thought it essential that Laos not become another in the "present
Soviet chain of successes," and that the United States demonstrate its unwillingness
"to concede world leadership to the communists." In a memorandum
to President Kennedy, he and Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric recommended
a deadline for the conclusion of a cease-fire. Laos might represent
18Ibid. The JCS figures included. on the government side. a 38,500-man regular army, almost
14.000 militiamen, and 6,000 Hmong guerrillas. The enemy'~es included the 1,500 North
Vietnamese, 4,000 Kong Le neutralists, and 11,000 Pathet Lao.U
"Dean Rusk, Telegram to Department of State, 27 April 1961,FRUS 1961-1963, 147nO
20 Telegram from Secretary Rusk to the Department of State, 28 April 1961, FRUS 1961-1963,
148-49·0
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