Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
THE HIGH WATER MARU
provide "electronic camouflage" to conceal the radar's purpose. "Scrambled"
transmissions to aircraft flying over the Gulf of Tonkin would belprorssed
and relayed as guidance tothe bombers approaching their targets.49
Hanoi might still infer the radar's purpose, but enciphered signals would at
least allow pro forma denial. The pretense of Laotian neutrality would also be
screened by American denials or refusal to comment, or by professions of
ignorance from Souvanna, should the radar's presence be publicly revealed.
These devices, Sullivan wrote, "should bring all of us angels together on the
head of the same pin.",oD
There were more concrete issues to be resolved, especially that of security.
With Chinook and Jolly Green Giant helicopters already fe!!)'ing comllonents
to Phou Pha Thi from the strip at Na Khang,I 1
I
irJe talked with Ambassador Sullivan
and COS Shackley, both of whom dismissed any possibility that the Hmong
irregulars at and around Phou Pha Thi could defend the facility against sustained
assault. The Hmong would do their best to provide early warning and
delay an attack, but, in the worst case, the gear would have to be destroyed
and the staff evacuated. Sullivan- emphasized that he would order the site
closed upon the appearance of a serious enemy threat. 51 D . .
Meanwhile, several hundred guerrillas directed by the Hmong command
post at Phou Pha Thi would patrol an early-warning line on a 4-mile radius
from the installation. The radar, situated at the crest of the mountain, would be
rotected on three sides b sheer cliffs, and on the fourth by defenders
On I November, Operation Commando Club, as the air force called it,
began directing F-I05 fighter-bombers in raids over North Vietnam. Beset by
technical problems, it was also afflicted by the shaky morale of its staff, isolated
on their mountaintop only 15.miles from North Vietnamese territory.
Pilots also found it unsettling to have to follow its radioed commands on a
fixed course, with no deviation permitted to avoid antiaircraft fire. Nevertheless,
Commando Club directed 130 sorties during its first month."D
"Vientiane.Embassy TeltgramS 7403 (3 June 1967) and 108 (6 July 1967), FRUS 1964-1968.
581-82 and 593-94!
.$0 Vientiane Embassy Telegram108.0
~l Castle, One Day Too Long. 67-68 .
"Shackley interview; Castle. One Day Too Long. 57-58.0
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