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Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

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C05303949<br />

FOCUS ON THE PANHANDLED<br />

continued in leapfrog fashion until the enemy gave up the pursuit. But the<br />

defenders were impeded by 4,000 panicky refugees and sometimes could not<br />

even return the harassing fire that came from ahead as well as behind them.<br />

The rocky terrain closed in on the retreating column, and flank security<br />

became impossible. The I !leader saw terrified, screaming refugees<br />

surge forward and back on the trail, knocking soldiers off the narrow trail in<br />

their panic while enemy fire picked.off.military and civilian alike. Before it<br />

was over, some 300 refugees died.>U .<br />

Two days later, the exhausted survivors had managed II miles, andCJ<br />

delivered an airdrop of cooked food. At sundown, with the food just distributed,<br />

the enemy again struck in force, this time from the south. In the sudden<br />

chaos.l<br />

jalong with the acting regimental commander,<br />

and the team leader later estimated that he had seen another 100 people<br />

killed. On 5 May, only 1,000 of the 4,000 refugees had arrived at Nam<br />

Keng, almost 30 miles of precipitous mountain trails from Phou Non'] All<br />

told, 900 FAR soldiers and 400 Hmong irregulars joined]<br />

and<br />

the senior FAR commander among the missing. And the agony continued: an<br />

enemy probe two days later forced a withdrawal even farther south. D 28<br />

The enemy encroachments that began in early 1964 and accelerated during<br />

the political chaos of April and May, did achieve one decisive political effect.<br />

Souvanna Phouma, no longer hoping for restraint from the Pathet Lao and<br />

Hanoi, essentially abandoned the idea that neutrality could be achieved or<br />

preserved by accommodation. He did not, of course, formally repudiate the<br />

coalition, something that would have invited Hanoi into the Mekong Valley.<br />

But his newly combative stance prompted Ambassador Unger to make the<br />

unprecedented suggestion in mid-May that T-28 fighter-bombers flown by<br />

American pilots be deployed against the advancing enemy. Souvanna did not<br />

hesitate, and a week later, Air America pilots were bombing and strafing<br />

enemy positions both east and west of the Plain of Jars. From this point on,<br />

Air America helicopters resumed flying troops and ordnance as they had<br />

done before October 1962."0<br />

On 20 May, Souvanna told Unger that "the only way Laos could be saved<br />

from the communists was by military intervention by the Western Powers."<br />

Washington responded in terms of the now-conventional formula: convene the<br />

::0<br />

29 Vientiane Embassy Telegrams 1329 (17 May (964) and 1411 (24 May 1964). FRUS 1964­<br />

1968,86-87, passim and 105. Unger rescinded this a few days later; the T-28s were taking too<br />

many hits, Butl ,nd USAF ~ilnts shortiy re~laeed them.O L<br />

_<br />

E -<br />

SErL.'TIIMR<br />

7 191

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