Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
More Pressure on Phoumi D
SQUEEZING AN su.rD
Once again, on the point of decisive action, Washington pulled back; the
signal to withdraw Air America was not sent. Almost three weeks later, Headquarters
informed I
Ithat "the President is personally concerned
to make sure that all US representatives use [their] full persuasive
power with Gen. Phoumi" to get him to help set up an "effective Souvanna
government." I Iwas to impress on Phoumi that the United States
"really will not allow itself to be driven into a war in Laos by [his] intransigence."
The message ended with an injunction to "leave him in no doubt
whatever that all branches of the US Government are at one in execution of
policy set by [the] President."I4D
Assurance of CIA fidelity to administration policy was to be followed by a
visit from Admiral Felt, carrying the same message. Ambassador Brown
apparently assumed this ploy to have been sparked by Harriman's recollection
of the pro-Phoumi bias displayed by CIA and military representatives at
Savannakhet in late 1960. But Brown was confident that Phoumi was "no
longer counting on divided US opinion," and he urged against a visit that
could only be interpreted to US disadvantage. Souvanna, the communists, the
Thai, and almost certainly Phoumi himself would remember the attention
from Admiral Felt and forget or ignore the message."0
Governor Harriman persisted, sending Brown a "Dear Win" letter defining
the ambassador's task as one of working out "how-and not whether-a coalition
government under Souvanna's leadership with a reasonable chance of
success is [to be] formed." Brown should understand that
our job is not to confront the President with a situation requiring a
decision on whether to permit Laos to be overrun by the Commies,
or introduce American combat forces. A President cannot be asked
to make such a decision in advance. We have got to start skating,
even though we don't know how firm the ice may be in tlie center of
the pond."D
The skating began on 6 March when, seeing Phoumi within minutes of each
other,I land Admiral Felt told him that the US government held him
14 TeJe ram From the White House to Vientiane undated FRUS·1961-1963 633-34.1
16 Letter from Assistant Secretary of State (Harriman) to Ambassador (Brown), 1 March 1962,
FRUS 1961-1963, 641-42, The letter expresses Harriman's frustration at the well-informed
objections from Vientiane to various of his tactical proposals and implies that Brown is insufficiently
aggressive in bending the RLG to.American will.D
SEC1T'fMR
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