Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
A LIMITED OFFENSIVED
support, they all had their work cut out for them. Much more ambitious than
its two predecessors, the plan called for attacks on two vulnerable stretches of
the road. On one of these, between Ban Ban and the Plain of Jars; Hmong
irregularsI
~ould try to blast down onto the road a section
of the cliff that loomed over it. The second and larger operation would
emplace 240 cratering charges (20 for each of 12 SOU platoons) in the rocky
roadbed east of Ban Ban. Yang Pao thought he would have to hold that segment
for 12 hours, defending it against attack from either east or west, and the
site lay only some three hours by truck from the North Vietnamese border.
Even assuming complete surprise, the enemy might have time to react.)SD
Adding to the risks was the Pathct Lao force that defended this eastern segment.
Yang Pao was confident that the Hmong could deal with the companysized
unit known to be stationed there, but if more enemy were concealed in
the area, and especially if there were North Vietnamese among them, hard
resistance might result in the mission's being aborted. In the best of circumstances,
success would depend on excellent communications between demolitions
elements and the two battalions of local irregulars, one each on the east
and the west, protecting their flanks. Should they hear firing, the SOU platoons
laying the charges would need to know how soon their location might
come under attack. Even though bolstered byI Ithey might
otherwise exaggerate the imminence of a North Vietnamese attack and prematurely
take to the hills. 3·D
The unprecedented communications and coordination requirements on
Yang Pao and his irregulars sufficed to make the effort a chancy one, at best.
Then, nine days of torrential rain in late July forced Yang Pao to choose a different
forward support base, farther from Route 7, and the helicopters would
now have a longer flight to the target. This complication lengthened the odds,
and I
!began to have second thoughts. "Vang Pao will be
lucky to hold the road 12 hours ... Frankly, we have reservations as to
whether or not this operation will fully succeed."37D
This kind of candor elicited a predictably cautionary word from Bill Colby:
"While [we are] in no sense seeking [a] sure bet ... there is considerable
breath-holding here" regarding a stron communist reaction to this "provocation."
But he left the decision to
who responded by assuring him
that would rig the charges, andl I
would serve the heavy weapons.J8
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