Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
SECrT/fMR
SQUEEZING ANAUG
program in the northwest also had less ambitious goals. The North Vietnamese
had not penetrated that area on the same scale as they had Vang Pao's domain,
and in order to defend their families against Pathet Lao patrols, the Yao could
manage with old Springfield rifles and other leftovers from World War II. 40
D
.'
I
~rrowed a Hmong radio operator from Vang Pao, and Lair provided
the usual RS-I agent radio and one-time cipher pads. The uncertain security of
Yao territory precluded assigning I Ito Chao Mai's floating headquarters
in Nam Tha Province, but the radio sufficed until the provincial capital fell to
the communists. About that time, the radio failed, and by the time communications
were restored, the Geneva Agreements had been signed. As with the
other units, the immediate objective then became that of preserving the resistance
organization and using it for intelligence. D 41
.TheKha[]
In the second of the programs created in 1962, MAAG andI
I tmoved to extend to the far south a formula similar to that employed in
MR 2 and the northwest. On 5 March, an interagency Special Group message
authorized I !and MAAG to arm 12 companies of 100 Kha tribesmen
inhabiting the commanding terrain feature known as the Bolovens Plateau.
MAAG would exercise operational control of the activity, using the US Special
Forces teams known in Laos as "White Star," until and unless a peace
agreementrqUird military advisers to depart. At that point,1
I
r
. Meanwhilel supervised logistics and served as the ambassador's
channel for discussion of policy questions. [
De Vientiane Mission proposed in May to double the original force. With
24 companies, it intended to secure the entire Bolovens and then send Kba
units east and north with the ambitious objective of interdicting Viet Cong
lines of communication and eventually securing all of southern Laos. D
43
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The.record does not explain the sudden eruption of collegiality between and MAAG
Regarding the southern tribesmen: The people called Kha (slave) in the south were of the same
stock as the tribes farther north called Lao Theung and Khmu. The term "Kha" was so universal
that American advisers used it, without derogatory intent, and tribal leaders seem never to have
objected in even the most oblique fashion. Ethnic animosities were not limited to those between
lowland Lao and the hill peoples. There was also a peeking order among the latter, with the
Hmon contero tuous of all the tribes included under the label Lao Theun
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sEcJr'.TIfMR
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