Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
Chapter Ten
March, the administration had despaired of holding the line in South Vietnam
without deploying American combat units, and US Marines landed near Da
Nang to protect the US airbase there.1oD
"Pinpoint" vs, "Middle Course"D
In this atmosphere, nol
was likely to temper Washington's
new enthusiasm for cross-border operations, either by CIA into the DRV
or by MACV into Laos. As it happened, however, Douglas Blaufarb acquired
an able and forceful ally in the person of William Sullivan, a career Foreign
Service officer who replaced Leonard Unger as ambassador to Laos at the end
of 1964. In the opinion of I lofficers like Doug Blaufarb and D
ISullivan quickly came to understand the limitations of tribal irregulars.
This understanding drove his opposition both to the resistance concept
and to the MACV drive for a larger role, using South Vietnamese tribesmen in
cross-border operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail."D
I
Other factors influenced Sullivan's assertion of Vientiane's primacy, one
being the evident pleasure that a former junior naval officer found in running
his own war. But the new ambassador had other, more substantive, reasons for
a conservative approach to any military initiatives-certainly including bombing
missions by US aircraft-on Laotian soil. One of these was the imperative
to retain Souvanna Phouma's support for direct US military action against the
communists in Laos. Sullivan argued that using Laos to foment rebellion in
North Vietnam or turning the eastern Panhandle into a free-fire zone would
jeopardize the prime minister's continued support for unacknowledged US
attacks on communist forces and installations. Unless the United States was
prepared to jettison Souvanna for a fractious, incompetent military junta, this
had to be avoided.12D
Another danger arose from the prospect of a reconvened Geneva Conference.
Sullivan pointed out that the communists, fully aware of surreptitious
and technically illegal US activities in Laos, would use a conference for a propaganda
assault upon them. That they all responded to communist cease-fire
violations would not prevent their nearly certain suspension under a barrage of
publicity·13D
Also see State Telegram 809 to VientrefO March 1965, FRUS 1964--1968, 352-53. (U)
11 Blaufarb andl linterviews.
12 Bill Lair; Blaufarb interview; VientianeEmbassy Telegram 1511,22 March 1965, FRUS 1964­
1968,354-56·D
13 Vientiane Embassy Telegram 982,13 May 1965, FRUS 1964-1968, 365-