Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
FOCUS ON THE PANHANDLED
This occurred at a time when intelligence-some from CIA roadwatch
teams in the Corridor and some from military sources-indicated a massively
greater use of Laotian territory for North Vietnamese infiltration into the
South. The assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem just three weeks before
the death of John F. Kennedy had been followed early in 1964 by a disastrous
slump in Saigon's military fortunes, and in .April it appeared to Washington
that Hanoi might be moving in for the kill. The dispatch of integral combat
units-not just advisers and specialists-down the Ho Chi Minh Trail would
drastically change the balance in South Vietnam and threaten the end of Laotian
neutrality. In this climate, General Phoumi had flown in mid-March to
Dalat, .South Vietnam, to see the junta that had replaced President Diem.
Saigon's generals seemed amenable to military intervention in the Panhandle,
.and Phoumi-always disposed to let others do the fighting-agreed to South
Vietnamese air raids and regimental-size ground operations in the Corridor."
o .
Distrustful of Phoumi, Ambassador Unger used Agency reporting from
Saigon to keep Souvanna fully informed. The prudence of this emerged when
the prime minister reported that Phoumi had informed him of the Dalat session
in only the "briefest and most general terms." Souvanna promptly vetoed
the regimental operations and air raids on Tchepone, but Unger won his assent
to small-scale cross-border operations into southern Laos and a covert South
Vietnamese military liaison with FAR at Savannakhet. 16D .
It seems that no one had thought to keep the American hand out of this quarrel
by getting Phoumi to give Souvanna a full account of the Dalat session; perhaps
the general's low credibility with the embassy did not suffice to make the
effort look worthwhile. Whether or not Phoumi knew of Unger's briefing of
Souvanna, the continual tension between the prime minister and the rightists
reached critical mass on 19 April. Phoumi allies in Vientiane arrested Souvanna
and the other neutralists in the government and set up a military junta.
State issued a prompt disavowal of US encouragement or endorsement, a statement
that President Johnson, apparently not sure he still wanted to preserve the
nominal coalition, privately deplored as premature.l7D
No such doubt afflicted the embassy in Vientiane, which saw nothing but
disaster if the coup were not quickly squelched. For one thing, Kong Le might
in a "fit of rage" simply give up on.Souvanna and resume his alliance with the
IS Memorandum from DIA Deputy Director (Fitch) to Secretary McNamara, "Cross Border
Patrols in Southern Laos," 9 April 1964; Telegram from CIA to State, 16 Mar~64; Vientiane
Embassy Telegram 1023, 19 March 1964; all FRUS 1964--1968, 42, 32, 34-37U
16 Vientiane Embassy Telegram 1023.0
11 Situation Report No. I, "LAOS," 19 April 1964, and State Telegram 69 to Secretary Rusk at
Saigon. 19 April 1964, FRUS 1964-1968, 43, 46-47.0
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