22.10.2014 Views

Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

C05303949<br />

EVERYBODY'S PAWG<br />

I<br />

I'<br />

Siho met Methven's reproach for this blatant fraud with a jaunty question,<br />

"What is your year of birth?" The startled Methven gave it to him, and Siho<br />

erased the number of Pathet Lao votes-a three-digit figure, at most-and<br />

replaced it with a more generous 1,927. Methven assumed that Siho's fraudulent<br />

count was taking place with Phoumi's acquiescence; at best, the general<br />

had clearly done nothing to ensure the integrity of the electoral process. 29 0<br />

The Department of State worried that the vote-rigging would invalidate the<br />

election in the international arena, but DCI Allen Dulles was inclined to treat<br />

it more as a youthful prank. The end result was a new National Assembly<br />

entirely without Pathet Lao representation, a desirable outcome certainly, but<br />

a better omen had it demoristrably represented voter preferences. 3 °D<br />

In concert with the British, French, and Australians, the US Mission in<br />

Vientiane plunged into maneuvers designed to keep the CDNI from what it<br />

saw as a potentially destructive bid by the military to dominate the new government.<br />

The noncontroversial Tiao Somsanith became prime minister,<br />

Phoumi Nosavan settled for the defense minister's portfolio, and the summer<br />

began in relative tranquility. 0 31<br />

Ambassador Smith left in May. His replacement, the genteel, judicious<br />

Winthrop Brown,<br />

evert e ess, e two quic y ispose 0 any resr ue 0 1<br />

ee mg c t e ind by their predecessors and established a relationship of<br />

mutual trust.32D<br />

_Under new management and in a more cooperative atmospherej<br />

began to expand its political organizing efforts to reach ethnic minority groups<br />

traditionally despised by the dominant Lao.I<br />

IStuart Methven<br />

later recalled that, although nominally sponsored by the CDNI, the effort was<br />

I<br />

I.<br />

I<br />

28 State Telegram 1921 to Vientiane, 26 April 1960, FRUS 1958-1960, 751; Stuart Methven,<br />

interview by the author, McLean, VA, 26 November 1996 (hereafter cited as Methven interview).<br />

Methven wasI Fase officer who provided advice and support to CDNI leaders.D<br />

29 Methven interview. Methven recalled that] Icontinued to support CDNI organizing<br />

efforts during the summer, and progress extended beyond provincial capitals into at least some<br />

district towns. This provoked several instances of Pathet Lao harassment, but the fate of the<br />

effort may have been presaged by a rally in the late spring at which the crowd was to symbolize<br />

its call to "burn out corruption" by burning posters bearing that slogan. A sudden, unseasonably<br />

early monsoon shower dampened the crowd and got the posters wet enough to prevent their<br />

being set afire.1I<br />

'30 State Te1egra1nr921 to Vientiane, 26 April 1960, and Editorial Note, FRUS 1958-1960, 51-52.<br />

D --<br />

31 Vientiane Embassy Tregrjm 2850, 7 May 1960, FRUS 1958-/960, 762-65 and passimD<br />

32 Author's recollection.<br />

SEC /T/fMR<br />

~~

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!