Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

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THE "MEO HEARTI.AND"O
The Agency was to serve as much more than a communications channel.
Secrecy required a covert supply line, and the White House ordered CIA to
take on this function as well. And while trying to save Long Tieng and the Laotian
government's position in northeastern Laos, the Agency was also to ensure
that the White House was saved from presiding over a disaster. Kissinger had
"made it clear that higher authority, although wishing a maximum defense,
[wanted] to avoid a Dien Bien Phu" kind of outcome; "orderly withdrawal"
was "without question better than being overrun." Headquarters told Vientiane
it was setting up an around-the-clock task force to help keep tabs on the tactical
situation and to help "guard against any debacle."I
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The Panhandle SGUs had stabilized Hmong defenses, and I
I jallowed Yang Pao to send SGU elements to hit the enemy's rear
areas. These raids, complemented by several productive B-52 raids, allowed
some forward movement on Skyline Ridge, the mountain immediately north
of Long Tieng, and at neighboring strong points. Devlin reported that as of
I April ,I
!the Lao were
"almost euphoric," but the COS saw little reason to rejoice. Things were
indeed much improved, but there had been "no place to go but up." The NVA
312'h Division was ready to pounce, whenever Hanoi removed the leash, and
the 766'h Independent Regiment threatened the southwestern flank. But FAR
had moved one regular battalion in from Pakse, and others were promised,
and the COS said he was a little more optimistic than he'd been only a week
earlier·"D
At Headquarters, the respite induced more worry about an overaggressive
Yang Pao than it did about communist intentions for the remaining weeks of
the dry season.I
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