Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
unnecessarily facile and inaccurate representation" of the operation's intent.
The Ban Ban operation had been hampered by factors beyond the field's control,
he wrote, including "off-again/on-again" air support and Washington's
arbitrary deadlines. In any case, the only way to keep the enemy from massing
to overrun the base was to accept "some initial risk" by moving defensive elemcnts
onto the attack. Having, in his own view, set the record straight, Tovar
gave up on the Xieng Khouang option, telling Nelson that offensive operations
would proceed under the authorities and conditions already stated. 76 0
The Perils ofa Lead RolD
Events had already reminded everyone that the chess moves of tactical
planning might be foiled by intractable circumstances. For starters, the Kha
tribesmen comprising BG-308 walked off their defensive positions on 10
March and straggled back into Long Tieng. Refusing to be disarmed, they
posed the,prospect of internecine violence until it was finally determined that
their grievance was the Lao officer installed as battalion commander. It took
his removal and reolacement bv his Kha deoutv to ~et the men back on the
line.I
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An incident involving a CH-53 crash at Sam Thong put an entire Savannakhet
platoon out of action; it also killed the USAF pilotand copilot. And Long
Tieng could not expect much help from MR I SGUs. Luang Prabang came
under attack in March, and the prospects for implementing any of the four
options so vigorously debated began to fade. Hugh Tovar flew to Luang Prabang
on the 24 1h and found the FAR hierarchy in an almost catatonic funk.
Whether or not Hanoi actually intended to invest the city-the station thought
it did not-the fact remained that CIA irregulars, supplied with CIA photo and
signals intelligence, were about all that stood in the way of the North Vietnamese.
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